Awakening  Country and Faith: The Construction of Sino-Muslim Histories and Identities in the Early Twentieth Century by Huang, Mengyu
Wellesley College
Wellesley College Digital Scholarship and Archive
Honors Thesis Collection
2012
"Awakening" Country and Faith: The Construction




Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.wellesley.edu/thesiscollection
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Wellesley College Digital Scholarship and Archive. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Honors Thesis Collection by an authorized administrator of Wellesley College Digital Scholarship and Archive. For more information,
please contact ir@wellesley.edu.
Recommended Citation
Huang, Mengyu, ""Awakening" Country and Faith: The Construction of Sino-Muslim Histories and Identities in the Early Twentieth





“Awakening” Country and Faith: The Construction of Sino-Muslim Histories 








Submitted in Partial Fulfillment  
of the  
Prerequisite for Honors  













        It is my pleasure to thank the many people who made this thesis possible. Foremost, I must 
express sincere gratitude to my advisors Professors C. Pat Giersch and Y. Tak Matsusaka. Their 
guidance, encouragement, patience, and knowledge were all key ingredients in bringing this 
thesis to fruition. Professor Giersch’s “Chinese Frontier Experience, 1600 to the Present” 
seminar deserves credit for sparking and sustaining my interest in exploring Chinese ethnopolicy 
and Sino-Muslims. I am indebted to his advice throughout the initial planning and research 
stages. I am equally indebted to Professor Matsusaka for his assistance throughout the writing 
process. His careful reading of the drafts and always-insightful comments helped me sharpen my 
arguments and bring out the “melody” of each chapter. Any remaining mistakes are, of course, 
my own. 
 
        I must also extend my gratitude to the East Asian Studies Department for being my 
academic home throughout my four years at Wellesley and to director Professor Katharine 
Moon for her tremendous efforts in strengthening the program and resources available to majors. 
Professors Ellen Widmer and David Lindauer also deserve many warm and heartfelt thanks for 
serving as my major advisors and for further enriching my undergraduate academic experience.  
        The History Department deserves recognition for generously allowing me to participate in 
its honor thesis writing workshop. A special thanks to Professor Alejandra Osorio for leading 
the workshop and providing the extra push (i.e. deadlines) to keep me on track. I also want to 
thank the Jerome A. Schiff fellowship program for its financial support and the Wellesley 
Library and Technology Services staff for their assistance in helping to locate research 
materials.  
        To my sister Melrose and to all my friends (especially Lianna Lee, Jiali Lin, and Mariana 
Vanin)—thank you for lending me moral support and for putting up with your thesising friend 
throughout her highs and lows. Thank you for keeping me on task and/or providing plenty of 
distractions. Special thanks to my thesis buddy Rachel Shuen—I am forever grateful for the fact 
that we were there to help and commiserate with each other each step of the way.  
        Last but never the least, I would like to thank my parents for their unconditional support. 
Listening to their family stories instilled in me a love for history and an appreciation of the past. 





Table of Contents 
 
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………1 
Chapter 1: Contested Belonging and the Emergence of Chinese Nationalism………….……...11 
Chapter 2: The Multi-Racial Religious Melting Pot: Xing Hui Pian and New Approaches to 
Hui Identity in the Late Qing…………………………………………………………..……….32 
 
Chapter 3: Leaders of China’s Muslim Nationality—Sino-Muslim Identity in the Early 
Republican Era………………………………………………………………………………….54 
Chapter 4: Challenges to the “Republic of Five Lineages” and the Birth of an Independent 













In a 1962 lecture titled “The Historical Tradition of China’s Muslims” (Zhongguo 
Musilin de lishi chuantong), Hui historian Djamal al-Din Bai Shouyi (1909-2000) concluded to a 
crowd of historians at an international conference in Pakistan: “The historical tradition of 
China’s Muslims is not isolated, rather, it is an inseparable component of China’s historical 
tradition. China’s Muslims, together with the peoples of all of China’s nationalities [minzu], first 
among them the Han nationality, jointly create the great Chinese History.”2 
 Bai’s lecture grounds China’s Muslims firmly within the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) minzu paradigm as members of the country’s ten distinct Muslim nationalities. His quote 
also illustrates a curious paradox for the role of China’s Muslims within their country’s historical 
narrative and national mission. As essential cogs in the multiethnic wheel of the Chinese state, 
they are ‘inseparable’ and important participants, yet they still remain minority voices within the 
dominant, leading narrative of the Han Chinese majority.  
Official division of China’s Muslims into ten nationalities was a relatively recent 
phenomenon, the result of the PRC’s Ethnic Classification Project (minzu shibie) of the 1950s. 
While the majority of China’s Muslim nationalities is concentrated in the northwest and speaks 
Turkic-Altaic dialects, the Hui minzu, the most populous Muslim nationality, is distributed 
widely across the country and speaks mostly Han Chinese dialects. Because of the Hui’s claimed 
descent from historically-Muslim ancestors who intermarried with Chinese women and their 
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 All primary source translations from Chinese, unless cited, are my own. 
2 Translated in Zvi Ben-dor Benite, “From ‘Literati’ to ‘Ulama’: The Origins of Chinese Muslim Nationalist 
Historiography” in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Winter 2003/4), 86. The original version came 
from Bai Shouyi “Zhongguo Musilin de lisi chuantong” in Beijing shi fan da xue xue bao Vol. 2, No. 2 (1962). 
Reprinted in Bai Shouyi ed., Zhongguo Yisilanshi cankao (Yinchuan: Ningxia Ren min, 1982), 55. 
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cultural similarities with Han Chinese, they are also collectively grouped as the “Chinese 
Muslims.”3 
Though Muslims have lived in China since the Tang dynasty (618-907), their place 
within the Chinese historical narrative and the degrees by which they have been accepted as 
“Chinese” or stigmatized as “outsiders” are neither timeless nor guaranteed. Historian Jonathan 
Lipman argues that Chinese Muslims, as “familiar strangers,” were relegated to the margins of 
the Chinese narrative, whether as the exotic fanke (foreign guests) of the Tang and Song 
dynasties, the Mongol-serving conquerors and officials of the Yuan, or the “sinified barbarians” 
and rebels of the Ming and Qing. Only since the 1920s, amidst the struggles to define and unify a 




Transforming “Hui” from a Religious to an Ethnic Label 
Today, ethnic diversity and representation in the People’s Republic of China revolves 
around the magic number fifty-six. The image of China as a single polity composed of fifty-six, 
happily-coexisting ethnic nationalities (minzu) is reproduced and reinforced through a variety of 
mediums, from commemorative postcards to school textbooks and official ceremonies. A 
relatively recent phenomenon of Chinese history, this minzu paradigm was created to solve the 
question of representation within a new, Communist-led regime. When the PRC’s 1953 Election 
Law guaranteed each minority group, regardless of population, at least one seat within the 
National People’s Congress, the state had to whittle down the over four hundred groups who 
applied for recognition to a manageable number. Enlisting teams of researchers to create a 
                                                          
3
 Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), 109-110.  
4
 Jonathan N. Lipman, Familiar Strangers (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 212. 
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taxonomic structure and assess each group’s claims, the PRC executed an ambitious Ethnic 
Classification Project (minzu shibie) that eventually led to the winning “fifty-six” formula.5  
By the time of the 1950s Ethnic Classification Project, the Hui nationality (Huizu) 
already became a predetermined group, one “whose status as full-fledged minzu was beyond 
question and did not require further authentication,” despite the lack of a common language, 
locality, and other markers used to define the majority of China’s ethnic minorities.6 Dividing the 
country’s Muslim populations into ten distinct nationalities,7 the PRC distinguished between the 
Hui, who were geographically scattered and spoke mostly Han Chinese dialects, and other 
Muslim groups who were concentrated in the northwest and spoke Turkic-Altaic dialects. This 
represented a significant change from the late Qing and Republican era (spanning from the late 
nineteenth century to 1949), when the term “Hui” and its multiple iterations (huihui, huijiao ren, 
huimin, huizu, etc.) was used not as an exclusive ethnic identity but as a generic term for all 
Muslims in China and the world. Chinese-speaking or Sino-Muslims living in China proper, the 
population associated with today’s “Huizu,” were simply one subset.8 Distinguishing Hui from 
Han, the PRC also rejected Chiang Kai-shek’s organization of Chinese Muslims as a religious 
group (Huijiao) rather than a separate nationality.
9
  
                                                          
5
 Thomas S. Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2011), 71.  
6
 Thomas S. Mullaney, “Ethnic Classification Writ Large: The 1954 Yunnan Province” in China Information 
(Zhongguo qing bao) 18, No. 2 (July 2004), 213.  
7
 These ten Muslim nationalities include the Hui, Uighur, Kazakh, Dongxiang, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tajik, Uzbeks, Bonan, 
and Tatar. 
8
 Following in the footsteps of Lipman, I will use the term “Sino-Muslim” rather than “Hui” in pre-PRC contexts to 
refer to the Chinese-speaking Muslims who today under the PRC minzu paradigm would be categorized as “Huizu” 
and the term “Turkic Muslim” to refer to the other Muslim minzu groups in China. See Yufeng Mao, “A Muslim 
Vision for the Chinese Nation: Chinese Pilgrimage Missions to Mecca during World War II” in The Journal of Asian 
Studies, Vol. 70, No. 2 (May 2011), 373.  
9
 Chiang argued that “the difference between the Hans and Mohammedans [Huijiao tu] is only in religion and 
different habits of life.” See Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory (New York: Roy 
Publishers, 1947), 39-40. 
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Despite this official recognition, the Hui was never simply a state-given category. In 
addition to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) actions, Sino-Muslims’ own active efforts to 
construct their identity, a contingent process with Hui agency, contributed to the eventual 
recognition of an autonomous Hui minzu, an identity both separate from the Han Chinese 
majority and from the “non-Chinese” Muslim minorities. Throughout the late Qing and 
Republican years, Sino-Muslims held different views about whether all Muslims in China should 
be one nationality or if they should be considered as racially and ethnically heterogeneous while 
sharing one common religion. A study of this internal debate is necessary in order to understand 
how the term “Huizu” underwent the curious transformation from a religious to an ethnic 
category.  
Building on Dru C. Gladney’s argument that the construction of ethnic identity is an 
ongoing dialogical process shaped by negotiations between the state and the ethnic group within 
changing political, economic, and social contexts,
10
 this thesis examines the rhetorical and 
thematic strategies adopted by urban Sino-Muslim intellectuals and how these strategies shaped 
the formation of a collective Sino-Muslim identity and historiography. With early twentieth-
century Sino-Muslim publications as a foundation for analysis, it highlights the shifting, 
ambiguous definition of “Huizu” as Sino-Muslims attempted to construct their dual identities to 
maintain simultaneously a distinction from the Han Chinese majority and inclusion within the 
dominant national narrative.  
The Meaning of “Minzu” 
The ambiguity of Sino-Muslim identity resulted in part from the ambiguity of the term 
“minzu” itself, an imported concept that did not enter mainstream Chinese intellectual discourse 
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 Dru C. Gladney, “Clashed Civilizations? Muslim and Chinese Identities in the PRC” in Making Majorities: 
Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 109.  
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until the turn of the twentieth century. As Pamela Crossley observed in her essay on the 
historical origins on “ethnicity” discourse in China, “Chinese as yet has no technical term for 
ethnos, or for nation, and thus minzu plays many contradictory roles in academic and popular 
writing.”11 While glossed over as equivalent to “nationality” and “ethnicity,” the term comes 
loaded with multiple historical connotations.  
“Minzu” was introduced to China through an adaptation of the Japanese term minzoku 
(which was itself an adaptation of the German term volk) by the 1880s, but widespread usage 
among Chinese intellectuals did not occur for another two decades. Used to express the emerging 
nationalism of the time, it carried the connotation of popular sovereignty and originally was 
meant to indicate majority rather than minority (shaoshu minzu) peoples, an embodiment of the 
“nation” or nation-state.12 The term “internally denoted the Han Chinese as a minzu that aimed to 
topple the Manchu regime and establish a more capable self-government. Externally it denoted 
China as a minzu aiming at restoring its respectable position in the world if not as the central 
country.”13 Due to its ambiguity, the term could refer to modern, social scientific categories of 
race, nation, people, ethnic group, or nationality, while also reconfiguring premodern categories 
of “lineage” (zu), “nature” (xing), “substance” (zhi) and “psycho-physical energy” (qi), 
depending on who was using it. While some intellectuals defined the term and its qualifications, 
others applied it loosely and synonymously with zhongzu (race).
14
 
                                                          
11
 Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Thinking About Ethnicity in Early Modern China,” in Late Imperial China 11, No. 1 (June 
1990), 20. 
12
 Charlotte Furth, “The Sage as Rebel: The Inner World of Chang Ping-lin” in The Limits of Change: Essays on 
Conservative Alternatives in Republican China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976). 
13
 Zhang Haiyang, “Wrestling with the Connotation of Chinese ‘Minzu’” in Economic and Political Weekly 32, No. 30 
(July 26-Aug. 1, 1997), 74.  
14
 James Leibold, “Positioning ‘Minzu’ Within Sun Yat-sen’s Discourse of Minzuzhuyi,” in Journal of Asian History 38, 
No. 2 (Sep. 9, 2004), 165 and 203-204.  “Minzoku” is today defined as “(1) a social group sharing many common 
characteristics in race, language, culture, religion, etc.; (2) a social group sharing a territory, an economy and a fate 
and forming a state. A nation.” See Kosaku Yoshino, s.v. "Minzoku," in Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Ritzer, 




A wealth of historical and anthropological scholarship exists on Sino-Muslims, covering 
everything from their origins in China to their validity as a separate ethnic category. In Familiar 
Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China, the first attempt by Western scholarship to 
provide a historical overview of Chinese Muslims, Lipman criticizes the extent to which Chinese 
and Western scholars have accepted Hui as an unproblematic label for Sino-Muslims by ignoring 
its anachronism when applied to the pre-PRC era. A diasporic study tracing 1300 years of 
Muslim acculturation, resistance, and integration in China, the book argues that Muslims played 
crucial roles in constructing Chinese identity during the Qing and Republican periods through 
“subverting the dominant definitions of Chineseness” as the eponymous “familiar strangers.”15  
 Focusing on Hui in contemporary Chinese society, Gladney categorizes them as subaltern 
subjects, “the very groups, individuals, and subjectivities that continue to be regarded as 
somehow less authentic, more peripheral, and farther removed from a core Chinese tradition.” 
Positioning the subaltern “other” as integral to the construction of modern “nationness” and the 
collective identity of the majority group, he criticizes their marginalization—a process which 
downplays the central role minorities play in China’s multicultural history. After extensive 
fieldwork among different Hui regional groups, Gladney observes a high degree of flexibility 
and diversity in how contemporary Hui express their ethnic identities.
16
   
 On the development of Sino-Muslim nationalist historiography, Zvi Ben-dor Benite has 
carefully studied the contributions of Sino-Muslim intellectuals in Ming and Qing China. His 
scholarship finds that Muslim scholars of the early Qing were the first to write a “communal 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.sociologyencyclopedia.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=g9781405124331_chunk_g978140512433119_ss1
-112 (accessed March 7, 2012).  
15
 Chapter two, covering a thousand years of history from the Tang to Ming dynasties, covers the entire cultural 
area of China, while the rest of the book mainly focuses on northwest China. Lipman, Familiar Strangers. 
16
 Gladney, Dislocating China, 363. 
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biography” of Hui origin myths that provided Republican-era Hui intellectuals with a rich 
tradition to build upon. With the advent of the twentieth century, Sino-Muslim urban 
intellectuals began linking Islamic revival with the creation of a modern, educated Chinese 
Muslim citizenry, a trend Benite found through examining publications such as Xing Hui Pian 
(Awakening the Hui), a 1908 journal started by the Islamic Educational Association of [Chinese 
Foreign Students] in Tokyo, as well as the proliferation of Sino-Muslim journals, books, and 
school textbooks in China’s major cities.17  
Multiple Chinese scholars, including contemporary Hui historians, have studied Sino-
Muslim activism and publication efforts since the late Qing, but their scholarship tends to adhere 
to the PRC minzu paradigm by presenting the Huizu as a timeless, reified entity while providing 
politically-orthodox interpretations of these journals as an early establishment of Hui patriotism. 
By linking religious and educational reform with national strengthening, Sino-Muslims had a 
“unique role in the course of promoting Chinese revolution” and continue to hold resonance 
today.
18
 The existing scholarship in English, meanwhile, remains thin.
19
 Responding to this gap, 
this thesis builds on the previous work of Benite, Mao Yufeng, and others in highlighting Sino-
Muslim intellectuals’ influence in the long process of defining a collective Hui identity and 
integrating the Muslim population in China into the Chinese nation-state. It attempts to provide a 
                                                          
17
 Zvi Ben-dor Benite, The Dao of Muhammad: A Cultural History of Muslims in Late Imperial China (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2005) and “From ‘Literati’ to ‘Ulama’,” 87-103. 
18
 For examples, see Gao Xiaoyan, “Lun Xing Hui Pian de Ai Guo Zhu Yi Si Xiang” (On the Patriotism of Xing Hui Pian), 
Xibei di er minzu xueyuan xuebao, No. 5 (2008), 43-45 and Ma Shouqian, “The Hui People’s Awakening from the 
End of the 19th Century to the Beginning of the 20th Century,” paper presented at the conference “The Legacy of 
Islam in China: An International Symposium in Memory of Joseph F. Fletcher. Harvard University, 14-16 April, 1989. 
19
 Other than Benite and Mao’s work, see Masumoto Masumi, “Rationalizing Patriotism Among Muslim Chinese: 
The impact of the Middle East on the Yuehua journal” and the brief survey in Francoise Aubin, “Islam on the Wings 
of Nationalism: The case of Muslim intellectuals in Republican China,” in St ephane A. Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu, 
and Yasushi Kosugi ed. Intellectuals in the Modern Islamic World: Transmission, Transformation, Communication 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 117-142 and 241-272, as well as Yufeng Mao, “A Muslim Vision for the 
Chinese Nation,” 373-395 and “Sino-Muslims in Chinese nation-building, 1906-1956” (Ph.D. dissertation, George 
Washington University, 2007). 
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more comprehensive look into their efforts and strategies through offering original 
interpretations of early Sino-Muslim publications.  
On the broader subject of Chinese nationalism and ethnic formation, Western scholars 
have established the ongoing efforts of twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals and politicians in 
constructing and propagating “a myth of national belonging based on the concept of an all-
encompassing Chinese nation, or Zhonghua minzu.”20 This process resulted in the identification 
and reification of minorities in order to incorporate them into the nation and supply “racialised 
Others against whom Chinese-ness could be defined or refined.”21 “Peripheral” peoples such as 
Tibetans, Mongols, Muslims, and Miao, were thought of as “ethnic relics destined for eventual 
assimilation with a superior ‘Han Chinese’ majority via the dispassionate ‘scientific law’ of 
‘natural selection’” in order to create a Han-centered Chinese nation. This type of thinking 
influenced both CCP and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) approaches to ethnic policy in the 
twentieth century.
22
 The majority of this scholarship, however, emphasizes the power of the state 
and Han intellectuals in shaping minority identities, thereby falling into the same trap as official 
Chinese historiography in overlooking or minimizing the agency of the minority players. By 
focusing on the role of Sino-Muslims, a traditionally marginalized group, the thesis contributes 
                                                          
20
 Mao Yufeng, “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation,” 374 as well as James Leibold, Reconfiguring the Chinese 
Nation: How the Qing Frontier and Its Indigenes Became Chinese (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) and 
Xiaoyuan Liu, Reins of Liberation: An Entangled History of Mongolian Independence, Chinese Territoriality, and 
Great Power Hegemony, 1911-1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).  
21
 Jonathan N. Lipman, “How Many Minzu in a Nation? Modern Travellers Meet China’s Frontier Peoples,” in Inner 
Asia 4 (2002), 117-118 and Dru C. Gladney ed. Making Majorities. Also reference Gladney’s Muslim Chinese: Ethnic 
Nationalism in the People’s Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) and Stevan Harrell, Cultural 
Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), Katherine Kaup, Creating 
the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2000), and Louisa Schein, Minority Rules: 
The Miao and the Feminine in China's Cultural Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).  
22
 Leibold, “Positioning ‘Minzu’,” 165.  
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My survey of Sino-Muslim intellectual discourse suggests three major turning points in 
the formation of Sino-Muslim identity, prior to its present definition under the PRC minzu 
paradigm. The first occurred at the dawn of the twentieth century with the rise of Han 
nationalism in the late Qing, the second during the “Chinese Republic of Five Lineages” 
(Zhonghua wuzu gonghe) of the early Republican years (1912-1928), and the third during the 
wartime environment of the 1930s. With the exception of the first chapter, which provides 
background, each chapter covers one of these turning points.  
The first chapter, “Contested Belonging and the Emergence of Chinese Nationalism,” 
supplies a general historical overview of Sino-Muslims from the Tang to the Qing dynasties, 
highlighting their ambiguous status as familiar and foreign entities, accepted as Chinese while 
still stigmatized as outsiders by state and society. It also explores the major events and trends of 
the late Qing that influenced the emergence of Chinese nationalism and new conceptualizations 
of identity. 
Chapter one provides the necessary context for the second chapter, “The Multi-Racial 
Religious Melting Pot: Xing Hui Pian and New Approaches to Hui Identity in the Late Qing,” 
which functions as the conceptual centerpiece of the thesis. Focusing primarily on an analysis of 
the first independently Chinese Muslim-run journal Xing Hui Pian (Awakening the Hui), chapter 
two examines Sino-Muslim intellectuals’ response to rising anti-Manchu rhetoric and Han 
                                                          
23
 In addition to the works previously mentioned, including that of Benite, Mao, and Gladney, see examples from 
Gray Tuttle, Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004) and 
contemporary anthropological studies such as Melissa Brown, Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan (Berkely 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996).  
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nationalism through defining “Hui” as a group composed of multiple races—including Han—a 
broad religious category encompassing all Muslims in China rather than a distinct minzu or 
nationality. Clamoring to be included within China’s modernization and nation-building process, 
they defended their belonging to the Chinese nation through emphasizing the universality of 
Islam while distinguishing themselves—spatially, culturally, and historically—from the Turkic 
Muslim groups in the Northwest, laying the foundation for the future ethnic division of China’s 
Muslims. 
The third chapter focuses on the advent of the “Chinese Republic of Five Lineages” 
(Zhonghua wuzu gonghe), the Chinese Muslim Progressive Association (Zhongguo Huijiao jujin 
hui), and the state-sponsored newspaper Huiwen baihua bao. Threatened by territorial loss and 
fragmentation, the nascent republican government downplayed racial and ethnic differences. 
Echoing the multiethnic hierarchical structure of the Qing empire, the state called for the unity of 
China’s five major minzu, defined as the Han, the Manchu, the Mongols, the Tibetans, and the 
Hui or Muslim groups in China. Under the republican system, which afforded greater 
representation rights to the five major nationalities than to religious groups, Sino-Muslim elites 
accepted the definition of Huizu under wuzu gonghe, taking advantage of their membership 
within the Hui to augment their political clout. They promoted the vision of Sino-Muslim 
leadership acting on behalf of all Muslims in China while continuing to underline the subtle 
differences between Sino and Turkic Muslims as a way to defend their Chineseness. Despite all 
being “Hui,” the greater levels of acculturation and socioeconomic and intellectual advancements 
among Sino-Muslims cast them as the proper candidates to help other Muslim groups become 
incorporated into the new Chinese nation.  
11 
 
Chapter four examines the mounting challenges to the Republic of Five Lineages 
conception of Hui identity, beginning in the 1930s. These challenges included the Japanese 
campaign to court support from Hui and other minorities in the buildup to the Second Sino-
Japanese War (1937-1945), the KMT’s mono-minzu policy under Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), 
and the emergence of a competing CCP ethnic policy. Interactions between Sino-Muslim groups, 
the state, and competing agents highlighted the strategic importance of Sino-Muslim allegiance 
and the influential part that Republican power politics played in shaping Chinese Muslims’ roles 
within China. The wartime environment also provided the impetus for a new body of scholarship 
that increasingly presented Sino-Muslims with a separate genealogical and cultural history from 

















Chapter 1: Contested Belonging and the Emergence of Chinese Nationalism 
China is the China of the Chinese. The government of China should be in the hands of the Chinese. 
 
--“The Manifesto of the Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenhui),” 190524 
The history of Sino-Muslims, from the Tang to the Qing dynasties, is a history of 
contested belonging. Their ambiguous status as simultaneously “Chinese” and “Muslim,” 
familiar and foreign entities, despite the frequent treatment of these two categories as mutually 
exclusive, presented problems for the state in terms of categorization and control. Acculturation 
did not prevent discrimination. Over the course of their presence in China, Sino-Muslims were, 
in varying degrees, accepted as Chinese while still stigmatized as outsiders by state and society. 
In this environment, Sino-Muslim elites actively advocated and justified the compatibility 
between their dual identities. Their strategies evolved with the shifting contexts of mainstream 
discourse. Changes in the late Qing set the stage for the emergence of Chinese nationalism and 
new conceptualizations of what constituted as “Chinese,” threatening to again stigmatize Sino-
Muslims as foreign entities while also presenting them with a new framework to assert their 
membership within the Chinese nation. As a springboard to examining how constructions of Hui 
identity and history underwent a significant transformation in the 1900s, this chapter focuses on 
the history of Sino-Muslim identity leading up to this period, as well as the major events and 
trends influencing Chinese and Sino-Muslim intellectual thought in the late Qing.  
Brief History of Chinese Muslims from Tang to Ming 
While the exact dates are unknown, modern historians trace Islam’s entrance in China to 
the Tang dynasty (618-907), decades after Muhammad’s famous flight from Mecca and Medina 
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 Formed in 1905 by the group of Chinese revolutionaries led by Sun Yat-sen to protest against the rule of the Qing 
imperial government, the Revolutionary Alliance portrayed the Manchus as foreign barbarians who illegally 
usurped power in China. They must be expelled in order to restore rule back to the “proper” hands of the [Han] 
Chinese. See “The Manifesto of the Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmeihui) (1905)” in Keith R. Schoppa, The Columbia 
Guide to Modern Chinese History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 278.  
13 
 
in 622. As merchants, emissaries, and soldiers, Muslims settled in major northwestern trading 
centers along the Silk Road or in China’s southeastern ports, living in communities known as 
fanfang (foreigners’ quarters). The Tang administration granted these communities a level of 
autonomy, and Muslims were generally free to practice their customs. While some Muslims did 
intermarry and participate within Chinese society, for the most part the Tang government and the 
fanfang communities themselves practiced a policy of segregation.
25
 Continuing to be treated as 
temporary fanke (foreign guests) rather than permanent subjects, the Muslim population 
increased during the Song dynasty (960-1276), but Muslims remained registered as foreign 
guests or local-born foreigners (tusheng fanke), even if they were native-born or had lived in the 
Chinese empire for generations.
26
 By the late twelfth century, the Song government granted the 
native-born and multi-generation fanke special status, allowing them to intermarry, buy land for 
mosques and cemeteries, and become officials. The country’s booming participation in 
international trade created opportunities for Muslim merchants to conduct business and start 
families with Chinese wives. As the children from these marriages grew up learning the local 
dialects of their mothers, Muslim settlements gained a greater sense of permanence. Despite a 
lack of specific legal discrimination, Chinese Muslims nevertheless continued to face the stigma 
of belonging to the foreign and merchant classes.
27
  
Muslim population and social status increased during the subsequent Yuan dynasty 
(1271-1368). The Mongol rulers set up an ethnic hierarchy system that placed Muslims and other 
non-Chinese under the category of semuren (literally ‘people with colored eyes’ but with a 
meaning closer to ‘assorted categories’), in an intermediate rank below the Mongolians but 
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 Lipman, Familiar Strangers, 25-28. 
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 Zhou Chuanbin and Ma Xuefeng, Development and Decline of Beijing’s Hui Muslim Community (Chiang Mai: 
Silkworm Books, 2009), 6. 
27
 Lipman, Familiar Strangers, 30-31. 
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above the hanren (Chinese) and nanren (Southern Chinese). Muslims served important roles in 
the Yuan bureaucracy, dominating fields such as astronomy, medicine, weapons manufacture, 
and foreign languages. Six became prime minister, and the Yuan government established a 
Huihui al-Qadi (Islamic Judicial) department to oversee Muslim affairs.
28
 The department was 
abolished and revived several times throughout the dynasty, based on the decline and rise of 
Sino-Muslims’ political status within the empire. Though Muslims’ positions under the Yuan 
government still showed signs of insecurity, the overall elevation of status during the Yuan 
allowed Sino-Muslim populations to continue to gain a sense of belonging and make the 
transition from being foreign fanke to native Muslims. Their favored status within the 
government, however, came with a price—namely the jealousy, fear, and contempt of the lower-
ranked hanren and nanren elite who perceived semu officials as the over-privileged underlings 




The trend toward belonging continued in the Ming (1368-1644) as increasing 
intermarriage, adoption of Chinese children, conversion of Chinese adults to Islam, and Ming 
government restrictions on contact with foreign communities contributed to both demographic 
growth and acculturation for Chinese Muslims. Discrimination remained resilient, as non-
Muslim officials often meted out harsher punishments for Muslims than for ordinary Chinese. 
The process of acculturation, especially the adoption of the Chinese language, led Muslims to 
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worry about losing their Islamic faith and values as their abilities to understand Arabic and 
Persian Islamic texts declined. The concern led to greater efforts to create a Sino-Muslim 
tradition. The Sino-Muslim literati, educated in both Confucian and Islamic schools of thought, 
created a new set of Han kitab (Han book) texts that translated traditional Arabic religious text 
into Chinese and blended in traditional Chinese texts such as the teachings of Laozi. The Ming 
literati opened the door to a new line of argument—Islamic tradition could reside alongside with, 
and even improve, Chinese tradition. The Han kitab canon gained popularity within the Sino-
Muslim community, but non-Muslim elites remained dismissive of the texts.
30
  
Ethnicity and the Status of Sino-Muslims in the Qing Empire 
The Qing dynasty (1644-1912) left behind a legacy of historical identities that profoundly 
influenced emerging discourses on nationality and ethnicity in the nineteenth century. In her 
study of Qing imperial ideology, Pamela Crossley defined the court’s pressing need to construct 
"categories of affiliation that would correspond to multiple, simultaneously expressed codes of 
legitimacy in the rulership.”31 As a conquest dynasty ruling over an empire that expanded Ming 
territorial holdings to include Mongolia, areas of Tibet, and eastern Turkestan (the Tarim Basin 
in southwestern Xinjiang province), the Qing asserted authority over their diverse subjects 
through a multiethnic hierarchy that placed the Manchu emperor and his clan, the Aisin Goro, at 
the center.
32
 The five distinct linguistic blocs in this hierarchy—understood as “historical peoples” 
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by the court and later reified as national or ethnic identities in the Chinese nation—described the 
empire’s major constituencies and shared, at least theoretically, parallel importance and power. 
They included the “Manchu,” “Mongol,” “Tibetan,” “Han” (Chinese), and “Hui” (Muslims, 
generally in reference to Turkic or Central Asian Muslims).
33
 Representation became a form of 
control, working in tandem with policies designed to decrease the actual power of these 
constituencies’ elites while augmenting that of the emperorship. In the case of Central Asian 
Muslims, the Qing acknowledged and praised their culture and history even amidst political 




Under this system of categorization, Sino-Muslims, as sinophones, did not constitute a 
separate bloc. Qing judges, bureaucrats, and emperors all struggled with the ambiguous nature of 
Sino-Muslim identity and the problems behind defining and managing people who belonged to 
two “mutually-exclusive” categories—Chinese and Muslim. By the Qing, Chinese Muslims lived 
all over the country, from Yunnan in the southwest to Heilongjiang in the northeast, from Gansu 
in the northwest to Fujian in the southeast. They adapted the languages and local cultures of non-
Muslim neighbors while still preserving differences, notably in their religious habits.  
Theoretically grouped under the Chinese category, Sino-Muslims were forced to adopt the Qing 
queue, unlike Turkic or non-Chinese-speaking Muslims, and followed state antimiscegenation 
laws in relations with the latter. The Manchu government described Xinjiang Muslims as 
shenghui (raw Hui) and yihui (barbarian Hui) while interior Muslims were shuhui (tamed Hui) or 
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However, society and state still distinguished Sino-Muslims from being “fully” Han 
through labels such as hanhui (Han Muslims), huizi, and donggan. Jurisdiction over their legal 
affairs fell under regular civil officials rather than the military or Lifan Yuan (which handled the 
empire’s relations with tributary areas and frontier groups such as Tibetans and Mongolians), a 
recognition of Sino-Muslims’ status as subjects within China proper, but Chinese officials still 
harbored age-old, negative Muslim stereotypes, highlighting Sino-Muslims’ “non-Chinese” 
qualities to explain their legal transgressions, conflicts with non-Muslim neighbors, and 
oppositions to state authority. The Qing’s attitude toward ethnic relations favored segregation as 
a way to minimize chances of ethnic conflict. Sino-Muslims provided the administration with a 
special challenge. They were scattered across the Chinese interior, which meant their leaders did 
not constitute an easy regional or linguistic, “cultural” bloc for the Qing to co-opt. Despite not 
being recognized as a separate ethnicity, Sino-Muslims lived in close proximity with non-
Muslim Chinese who perceived them as outsiders. Their presence, from the state’s point of view, 
maximized chances of conflict between the two groups. When violence did break out between 
Muslims and non-Muslims, the Chinese officials in charge often exaggerated the former’s share 
of blame in their reports to the court. This wariness in turn served to justify appeals to the Qing 
government for harsh measures to punish and further “tame” Sino-Muslim populations.36  
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Despite serious cases of discrimination and tensions between Sino-Muslims and the state, 
most notably in the Dungan Revolt (1862-1877), Qing imperial ideology offered some 
advantages to the Sino-Muslim elite. The need to stabilize the frontier and prevent future 
rebellions meant the state promoted Northwest Muslim local elites as administrators and military 
officers. Since Manchu emperors needed to project the image of an impartial, universal ruler 
giving fair treatment to all the peoples of their empire, they preached slogans such as “Equal 
benevolence toward Chinese and Muslim” (han hui yishi tongren) and were willing to support or 
prevent official suppression of Chinese Islamic publications.
37
 In this environment, the Qing 
Muslim literati built on Ming precedents to legitimize their place within the Confucian elite and 
the Qing multiethnic empire. Portraying Muhammad as a Great Sage akin to Confucius and 
themselves as scholars of both men’s teachings (as Hui Confucians or Huiru), their efforts led to 
even greater constructions of a distinct Sino-Muslim tradition and of Islam’s compatibility with 
other schools of thought. Following Chinese notions of identity through genealogy or lineage-
based ancestral descent and collective history (which grew in importance to the Qing court in the 
eighteenth century as it highlighted Manchu traditions and prestige to enhance its own power), 
Sino-Muslim scholars conceived of themselves as the descendants of a diaspora who occupied 
both an “imagined spatialized Islam” and China.38 
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Changes in the Late Qing: An Empire in Decline, A Nation in Development 
  By the dawn of the twentieth century, China had already descended into a state of crisis. 
Caught amidst decades of civil unrest and foreign invasions, the country scrambled to strengthen 
and modernize. Urban intellectuals attempted to unify China’s disparate populations and mold 
them into an active citizenry that would rescue the nation from decline. Meanwhile, the Manchu 
court’s struggles to maintain internal order and concessions to foreign imperialist powers, 
beginning with the First Opium War (1839-1842), eroded imperial authority and prestige while 
facilitating the devolution of power and military command to regional leaders. In a precursor to 
the anti-Qing discourse of the 1890s, leaders of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), a bloody 
civil war with a death toll of 20 million, attacked the Manchus as Satanic enslavers while aiming 
to restore Chinese rule. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom also carried out a system of population 
registration that grouped people under categories such as hanzu, mengzu, manzu (Han Chinese, 
Mongolian, and Manchu). In the last decade of the Qing, these terms would resurface in the 
racial rhetoric of Chinese nationalism.
39
  
 Responding to the major changes engulfing the late Qing, Muslim literati could no longer 
rely on their previous Confucian approach for legitimizing their place within China’s mainstream 
culture. Sino-Muslim identity now needed to fit within the new framework of Chinese 
nationalism, dominated by the racially-charged, anti-Manchu rhetoric and visions of a China 
ruled by the Han “Chinese.” Understanding the new conceptualizations of Sino-Muslim identity 
that emerged in the 1900s requires an understanding of the environment they were operating 
under. What major reforms did China undergo in the late Qing? What new discourses on 
nationalism and race emerged during this period? And how did these factors contribute to the 
creation of a “Han” majority and the spread of revolutionary, anti-Manchu sentiments? 
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Experimentation and debate over the content and pace of China’s modernization, along 
with greater exposure to foreign technologies and ideas, encouraged the proliferation of new 
associations and newspapers, giving rise to a public sphere of opinions and activism outside of 
the Qing state’s direct control.40 Treaty ports, being relatively immune from Qing jurisdiction, 
often served as the site for Chinese intellectuals to critique the government, engage in free debate, 
and mobilize reformist or revolutionary activity.
41
 Despite embarking on an ambitious Self-
Strengthening Movement (1861-1895) to “adopt Western ideas and excel in Western methods,” 
in the areas of firearms, military administration, technology, industry, and commerce,
42
 the Qing 
suffered a humiliating loss in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), defeated by a country 
historically dismissed as an “inferior” tributary state of the once “mighty” Chinese empire. Three 
years later, conservative factions successfully squashed the Hundred Day’s Reform, a program 
for greater political and ideological restructuring to complement the shortcomings of Self-
Strengthening. Perceptions regarding these “failed” reform efforts further weakened confidence 
in the government, emboldening calls for deeper, more-radical changes, including the complete 
overthrow of the dynasty.
43
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Anti-Manchu Propaganda and Constructing the Han Majority 
Anti-Manchu propaganda rose to prominence after the First Sino-Japanese War. It served 
multiple functions as a tool to discredit the Qing government and provide a collective target to 
incite the Chinese people into action. Contrasting Japan’s success with their country’s decline, 
intellectuals at home and abroad searched for what held China back from achieving the same 
success. One answer was the Manchus. As foreign usurpers of Chinese rule and a barbaric, 
predatory race, the Manchus were incapable of breaking the traditional obstacles and outmoded 
institutions standing in the way of modernization. In the words of Zou Rong (1885-1905), the 
Chinese people were “doubly enslaved”: “Domestically we are the slaves of the Manchus and we 
are suffering from their suppression, externally we are suffering from the harassment of the 
Great Powers…our race is on the verge of extermination. These are the reasons that our sacred 
Han race, descended from the Yellow Emperor, today calls for revolution and independence.”44 
The Manchus became dehumanized and vilified, described as nothing more than bandit spawn, 
beasts, and thieves who raped and pillaged their way to power. The Han Chinese became a 
people united by a shared descent and a collective history of former glory and present 
victimhood under the Qing. Under this construct, an either or relationship existed between 
Manchu and Chinese survival. Before they could break free from their external oppressors, the 
Chinese people needed to rise together to exterminate their internal oppressors and avenge their 
nation.  
Intense dissatisfaction with the state, coupled with exposure to Western liberal and 
radical ideas surrounding nationalism, revolution, and republicanism, led intellectuals to form 
numerous associations with an anti-Qing bias. The most notable was the Revolutionary Alliance 
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(Tongmenhui) founded in Tokyo on August 20, 1905 by Sun Yatsen (1866-1925), “Father of the 
[Chinese] Nation.”45 Between 1895 and 1912, Chinese nationalists “reclaimed” terms such as 
Guoyu (national language) from meaning Manchu to meaning Chinese, Hanjian (Han traitors) 
from referring to Chinese who betrayed the Qing empire to Chinese who willingly served the 
Qing empire.
46
 In mounting their offensive against the Manchus, Chinese nationalists harkened 
back to the earlier discourses of the Taipings and Ming loyalists. Sun, while establishing an anti-
Manchu “Revive China Society” (Xinzhonghui) in 1894, used a revised Ming slogan in pledging 
to “drive out the Tatar caitiffs [Manchus] and restore China” (quchu dalu, huifu Zhongguo).47 
Calling for the unity of all Chinese, Sun based his thinking in Confucian ideas of the superiority 
of Chinese civilization over barbarians, portraying Manchus as the latter by virtue of sharing a 
different lineage (yizu) than Huaren (Chinese).
48
  
Emergence of Social Darwinism and Minzu Discourse 
The creation of a racialized Manchu “Other”—as a toxic, foreign element in need of 
expulsion—juxtaposed against a native Han “Chinese” majority synonymous with the Chinese 
nation reflected the influence and emergence of Social Darwinism and minzu discourse. Ethnic 
nationalism was able to erupt during the late Qing because Chinese intellectuals began seeing 
China as a nation, a community or people bound by a shared descent, history, and culture, rather 
than simply a civilization or a culture. No longer could the Manchu rulers claim to be a part of 
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China through co-opting Chinese cultural practices such as language, dress, or Confucianism. 
Anti-Qing revolutionaries would point to the Manchus’ “foreign” descent to delegitimize their 
place within the nation. 
As Chinese thinkers encountered the writings of Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and 
Thomas Huxley, they applied Social Darwinian principles and language to the context of China 
through envisioning the Chinese nation and people as being locked in a competition with other 
nations and races for survival.
49
 This included framing the larger evolutionary struggle between 
yellow and white races (renzhong). In his 1902 essay “New Historiography” (Xin shixue), Liang 
Qichao (1644-1911) coined the term guozu (national race or state lineage) to describe the 
evolution of human struggle from past conflicts between clans (jiazu) and tribes (buzu) to the 
“highest stage” of impending battle between fully developed national races, with special 
reference to the Chinese and Anglo-Saxon minzu.
50
  
China needed to prepare for surviving such an impending battle. Credited as one of the 
greatest introducers of Social Darwinism to China, translator Yan Fu (1854-1921) argued in 
his1895 essay “Whence Strength?” (Yu qiang) that group and biological survival depended on 
“group solidarity” (qunzhuyi). 51 To achieve this solidarity, Chinese nationalists constructed a 
racial majority, the Han minzu, connected through sharing collective blood, genealogy, culture, 
history, and, most importantly, collective differences from the non-Han.
52
 Liang and Zhang 
Bingling (1868-1936) explained the term minzu as min plus zu, with zu meaning an inherited 
identity or established, historical peoples (the meaning of which had been institutionalized by the 
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Qing court in the eighteenth century to establish the ancestry and distinct identity of the Manchus) 
and min meaning civilian.
53
 
Zhang (whose 1903 essay famously called on the Chinese to “Slay the Manchus!”) 
belonged to the “national essence” (guocui) school of scholars. He developed his minzuzhuyi 
(nationalism) through combining Qing discourse on “distinguished lineages” (bian zulei) with 
the social evolutionist concept of blood (xue) to construct the Chinese as a Hanzu or Han 
lineage-race united by their common biological roots, their descent from the Yellow Emperor. 
Zhang similarly employed studies in fields such as etymology and history to essentialize Chinese 
culture and civilization. Believing that “nature molds racial identity, racial identity informs 
culture, and culture defines moral character,” Zhang also tracked Manchu descent in the 
historical record in order to prove their shared descent from the Donghu or Eastern barbarians of 
the Jin, a sign of their inherited savage, evil nature.
54
 In the rhetoric of revolutionaries like Zhang, 
by belonging to a different minzu than the Han, the Manchus were a weak, alien element 
threatening China’s solidarity and survival. Much like Zou Rong’s argument in The 
Revolutionary Army, the implication was that China would be at a disadvantage in its struggle 
against the white race if it remained shackled to the Manchus. Evolution and Chinese national 
solidarity demanded their removal.  
The New Systems (Xinzheng) Reforms (1901-1911) 
 Racial language against the Manchus offered the advantage of being less abstract and 
easier to grasp for the common people when compared to the concept of nationalism. Calling this 
strategy “expel the Manchus in order to facilitate a republic” (paimin yi xing gonghe), Liang 
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highlighted racial hatred as an effective way of generating public outcry and, therefore, a 
mechanism for instilling nationalism and revolutionary sentiments.
55
 Concerns over the brewing 
anti-Manchu movement and need to defend China against Western powers propelled the Qing 
toward enacting more radical reform measures in the 1900s. After the Boxer Rebellion (1898-
1901) resulted in another defeat and public-relations nightmare for the Qing government, the 
Empress Dowager Cixi (1835-1908) faced pressure to enact a series of sweeping institutional 
reforms, known collectively as the “New Systems” or “New Policy” (Xinzheng gaige), as 
damage control. The imperial court requested for proposals from governors and sent officials 
abroad to study and draw up plans for reforms in law, education, government organization, and 
social policy that often emulated the model of Meiji Japan. In an effort to bring the professional 
classes of the new elites under state regulation, the state set up professional associations (fatuan) 




 The New Systems Reforms also officially endorsed and outlined a plan for the Qing’s 
transition into a constitutional monarchy. This endorsement resulted in part from the outcome of 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), which the Chinese interpreted as not just the triumph of an 
Asian country over a European power but also the triumph of a constitutional power over an 
authoritarian regime. Encouraged by the possibilities that constitutional reform offered, the Qing 
sent missions abroad in 1906 to study the constitutional systems in Europe, America, and Japan, 
ultimately favoring the Meiji Japanese model because of its potential to strengthen the imperial 
court’s power. An edict in September 1907 foreshadowed the creation of the National Assembly 
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(Zizheng yuan) as a temporary organ tasked with the mission of setting up regulations and 
elections for future assemblies, stating, “A Constitution is necessary for the country. As the two 
Houses of Parliament cannot at once be inaugurated, it will be necessary at first to establish an 
Assembly of Ministers to confer on State matters and to prepare the foundations of 
Constitutional Government.”57  
In August 1908, Cixi formally announced China’s adaptation of constitutional principles 
and also released a nine-year calendar for establishing constitutional forms, including provisional 
provincial assemblies in 1909, followed by a provisional national assembly in 1910, and 
culminating in a full constitutional system by 1917. Membership in the provincial assemblies 
was extended to males of at least thirty years of age, who were either natives to the province or 
residents for a minimum of ten years. As representatives of public opinion, they were to be 
elected in two rounds, by delegates elected by the people.
58
 With property and education 
requirements determining electorate eligibility, only about 1.7 million men or 0.4 percent of the 
population ended up being registered to vote.
59
 
Out of all the New Systems policies, the one with the most far-reaching consequences 
occurred on September 2, 1905, when an imperial decree abolished the thousand-year-old 
traditional civil service examination and Confucian schooling system. Governors-general and 
governors were instructed to increase the number of modern schools, from primary to 
universities, as a replacement channel for obtaining degrees and official posts. In this transitory 
period, when the new universities being created still lacked adequate capacity to accommodate 
and graduate large numbers of students, Chinese students faced limited options for social and 
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educational advancement. Some enrolled in military academies while others headed overseas to 
take advantage of the educational opportunities abroad. The state allowed those educated abroad, 
for a period of at least three years, to acquire degrees back home, provided that they passed 
examinations at the Ministry of Education and the imperial palace.
60
 Growing numbers of 
students went abroad to Europe and America, but the most popular destination remained Japan 
due to its geographical and cultural proximity, as well as the growing fascination surrounding the 
country’s successful modernization and recent wartime triumphs. The Qing had sent students 
abroad to Japan since the 1890s, with numbers rising from two hundred in 1899 to thirteen 
thousand in 1906.
61
 Roughly half of the Chinese students heading to Japan in the 1900s were 




The Revolutionaries Respond 
The New Systems Reforms aimed to wrest momentum away from the revolutionaries, 
quelling some of the violent appetite for institutional change with the alternative of a viable top-
down modernization program. Despite its efforts, the late Qing reformation process failed to 
placate revolutionaries who, newly energized after the humiliation of the Boxer Rebellion and 
foreign occupation of the capital, remained determined to reject the Manchu government. 
Reactions to the crackdown of revolutionaries, including the death of Zou Rong while serving a 
two-year prison sentence for lese-majesty and the suicide of Chen Tianhua (1875-1905) in 
protest of the Japanese government's intention to restrict the activities of Chinese students abroad, 
created martyrs to further galvanize the movement. Violent cries for “racial revolution” spread 
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amongst the student community. To maintain momentum, Chinese nationalists released another 
torrent of anti-Manchu propaganda. The goal was to destroy the credibility of the Manchu Qing 
government through attacking not just the imperial system but the credibility of the Manchu 
people as a whole.
63
  
Divergent views between “reformist” and “revolutionary” camps, commonly represented 
by Liang and Sun, also propelled the latter toward sharpening its calls for radical action. 
Following the Hundred Days Reform and his resulting exile to Japan in 1898, Liang reversed his 
previous anti-Manchu rhetoric, switching from supporting a racial revolution to a constitutional 
monarchy and protecting the emperor (baohuang).  He advocated for a “broad minzuzhuyi” that 
emphasized the mixing of races, rather than preserving one pure bloodline, as the path toward 
evolutionary “racial improvement,” the real key to survival. Criticizing Zhang’s “narrow or petty 
minzuzhuyi,” which called for a racially-homogeneous Han China, Liang proposed that, rather 
than expulsion, “inferior” races like the Manchus should mix with the “superior” to unite all 
Chinese minzus into one guomin (citizenry) or guozu. Unlike Sun, Liang believed the New 
Systems reforms, especially the lifting of the ban on Han-Manchu intermarriage in 1902, proved 
the Manchus were already assimilated with the Han or Sinicized (zhongguohua).
64 Liang became 
more concerned with creating a national empire, following the Qing five-bloc model, made up of 
multiple “historical” groups such as the Manchus, Mongols, Muslims, Tibetans, and Han.65 
While not completely opposed to Liang’s non-racial concept of China and its citizens, 
Sun could not agree with the claims regarding Manchu assimilation since that would hurt his 
justifications for revolution. Upon discovery after his return to Japan in 1903 that Revive China 
Society members were siding with Liang’s call for constitutional monarchy and gradual reform, 
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Sun formed the Revolutionary Alliance and began utilizing Zhang’s anti-Manchu rhetoric to 
attack Liang and other reformers’ views, stressing the link between anti-Manchuism and 
patriotism even though he shared Liang’s concerns over Zhang’s racially-homogenous concept 
of China. Zhang initially favored granting national determination, including territorial 
sovereignty, to non-Han minzus such as Northwest Muslims, but this was unacceptable for 
revolutionaries like Sun who wanted to exclude Manchus from the Chinese minzu to secure Han 
sovereignty while still retaining the Manchu empire’s territorial holdings. The ideological divide 
between Sun and Zhang remained unresolved, leading to a split in November 1909.
66
 
Amongst its goals, the Revolutionary Alliance vowed to uphold nationalism and 
republicanism. In their manifesto, alliance members portrayed themselves as a “righteous [or 
patriotic] army” raised by the men of Han (i.e. Chinese) to exterminate the “northern barbarians” 
(Manchus) and restore China for posterity, declaring, “The Manchus [in the seventeenth 
century]… conquered China, and enslaved our Chinese people. Those who opposed them were 
killed by the hundreds of thousands, and our Chinese have been a people without a nation for 
two hundred and sixty years. The extreme cruelties and tyrannies of the Manchu government 
have now reached their limit. With the righteous army poised against them, we will overthrow 
that government, and restore our sovereign rights…”67 Refuting Liang’s view, Revolutionary 
Alliance member Wang Jingwei (1883-1944) argued that the Manchus still retained their old 
culture. Rather than properly assimilating with the Han, they tried to destroy the Han racial 
consciousness through forcing the Han to assimilate to Manchu practices. Evolutionary evidence 
pointed to the fact that the most successful states were those with only one minzu. Only in this 
kind of environment could true equality and freedom flourish, because members of the same 
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minzu possessed “innate” mutual interests and amity while those who “are not of our kin are sure 
to have different minds” (feiwo zulei qinxin biyi).68 
Statements like the above represented the common employment of racial invectives and 
historical interpretations by Chinese nationalists to endow Manchus with crimes against China 
and inherent qualities justifying their overthrow. As one reaction to the announcement of the 
New Systems Reforms noted, “To this day the Manchus are as cruel and inhuman as in former 
times. Using the cover of false promises about introducing a constitution they seek to ward off 
the vengeance of the Han. In order to maintain their foul tribe of five million, 400 million Hans 
deny themselves bare necessities, and exhaust all their spiritual and physical strength.”69 Any 
Qing-led reforms, no matter how sweeping in its promises, still represented the oppression of the 
Han majority by a tyrannical Manchu minority. Moreover, they would be meaningless and 
disingenuous by nature, mere subterfuges to distract the Chinese from the true course. Only 
revolution could provide national salvation.  
Closing Remarks 
The tactical use of anti-Manchu propaganda to evoke Han nationalism effectively 
discredited the Qing government while justifying the revolutionary cause. However, through 
focusing on Han sovereignty and delineating this imagined Han majority as the timeless 
embodiment of the Chinese nation, this strategy exacted the cost of rejecting the country’s “non-
Han” populations. If the Manchus could be so violently branded as foreign, barbaric, and 
destructive, what was to stop the Mongols, Tibetans, Muslims, and other perceived “minorities” 
from sharing a similar fate?  Worries over this “narrow” conception of the Chinese nation led 
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intellectuals like Liang to return to the Qing’s multicultural, five-bloc corporatist model and 
argue for the inclusion of “non-Han” groups.  
But Han Chinese were not the only participants in this conversation. Influenced by the 
same kinds of forces and debate over national strengthening as their non-Muslim counterparts, 
Sino-Muslims, whose membership within the dominant Chinese culture had been historically 
questioned by state and society, responded to this latest threat of exclusion with a flurry of 
activism to establish their value and membership in the new national narrative. The tensions 
behind where Sino-Muslims could fit in within competing visions—from Zhang’s racially-
homogeneous, Han-centered rhetoric to Liang’s heterogeneous, Qing-inspired approach—would 
continue to play out in the coming decades of the twentieth century.  
As the Manchu government became depicted as a failing institution, a number of Sino-
Muslim intellectuals disassociated from the dynasty and joined the revolutionary movement. 
Responding to the anti-Manchu campaigns of the revolutionaries, they would portray Sino-
Muslims as Muslim Han, as historically-established, native elements of China. Through an 
analysis of articles from the first independently Hui-run journal Xing Hui Pian (Awakening the 
Hui), the next chapter will explore how late Qing Muslim intellectuals took advantage of the 








Chapter 2: The Multi-Racial Religious Melting Pot: Xing Hui Pian and New Approaches to 
Hui Identity in the Late Qing 






 The powder-keg climate of the late Qing, with its flood of new ideas and reformist 
movements, heavily influenced Muslim intellectuals in China. The conceptualizations of 
nationhood, identity, and civic responsibility that emerged during this period offered Sino-
Muslims the opportunity to participate in the ongoing dialogue and to advocate for their own 
visions of China’s future. Sino-Muslim elites participated in the wave of intellectual activism, 
studying abroad and founding new reform-minded organizations and publications in major cities 
such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Nanjing. Through addressing their fellow Muslim 
countrymen and urging them to “awaken” from their current outdated, insulated ways of thinking, 
these Sino-Muslim urban intellectuals, like their Han counterparts, attempted to unify their 
disparate populations into an active citizenry capable of rescuing China from decline. Situating 
themselves within the histories of Islamic and Chinese civilization, Sino-Muslims held onto their 
dual identities, defending the compatibility between strengthening their faith and strengthening 
their nation. Celebrating Islam’s historic role in advancing reform and scientific achievements, 
they argued that Chinese Muslims shared the inherent capacity to lead China toward 
modernization, countering traditional stereotypes that portrayed the Hui as backwards, savage, 
and destructively violent.  
 The shifting discourses on national and racial identity, however, also posed serious 
challenges to Sino-Muslims. Attacking the legitimacy of the Manchu government, 
                                                          
70
Huang Zhenpan, “Lun Hui min” (On the Hui people) and “Zong jiao yu jiao yu guan xi” (The relationship between 
religion and education) in Xing Hui Pian (Awakening the Hui). (Dongjing : Liudong qingzhen jiaoyuhui shiwusuo, 
1908. Reprint: Vol. 1 of Zhongguo Yisilan li shi bao kan cui bian. Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 1992), 58.  
33 
 
revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) and Zhang Binglin (1868-1936) had mobilized 
culture for nationalist goals, inventing a racial and ethnic category—the Han—as the dominant 
political majority. Positioning the Han as the legitimate descendants of Chinese tradition and the 
rightful leaders of a new China, their discourse threatened to exclude Muslims and other 
minority groups from positions of influence in the emerging nation-state. New conceptions of 
Hui identity arose from this environment of opportunity and danger.  
Fearing that they would be linked to non-Han ethnicities and, therefore, targeted for 
exclusion from the Han Chinese nation, Sino-Muslim intellectuals tended to adopt inclusionary 
rhetoric, emphasizing the universality of Islam and its unifying power.  They portrayed the Hui 
as a group composed of multiple races—including Han—rather than as a distinct minzu or 
nationality. Under this definition, Sino-Muslims could function as Muslim Han, joining the 
majority of the Han Chinese nation without sacrificing their Islamic heritage. Despite defending 
“Hui” as a broad religious, multicultural category encompassing all Muslims in China, Sino-
Muslims also adopted, in their quest to authenticate the “Chinese” aspect of their identity, a 
seemingly contradictory strategy of excluding or distinguishing themselves (as Muslims living in 
the Chinese interior) from Northwest Turkic Muslim groups. They employed spatial, cultural, 
and historical barriers to accomplish this differentiation, laying the rhetorical groundwork for the 
future ethnic division of China’s Muslim groups.  
Sino-Muslim Activism in the Late Qing 
Since the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895), Chinese intellectuals had debated 
and executed proposals to help the country modernize and gain the capability to defend against 
foreign imperialist powers. They adopted new technologies and clamored for institutional 
reforms, founding new schools, publications, and societies to advocate their ideas in the public 
34 
 
sphere. Sino-Muslim participation in the late-Qing modernist movements took on a variety of 
forms. Aligning with slogans such as “save the country through education” (jiaoyu jiuguo), “the 
educated prosper, the uneducated perish” (youjiaoyuzhechang, wujiaoyuzhewang), and “those 
with old education die while those with new education live” (jiujiaoyuzhesi, 
xinjiaoyuzhesheng),
71
 reform of the traditional mosque-style education system was a key priority. 
Advocates of the “new-style education” (xinshi jiaoyu) called for spreading primary education, 
with the eventual establishment of a national network of Islamic schools. They also called for 
curriculum updates to improve Sino-Arabic instruction and, increasingly, to introduce “modern” 
subjects such as arithmetic and science. The “old” Islamic doctrine (laoiiao) should be reformed 
to supersede Chinese Muslims’ faith toward the emperor with faith toward the new Chinese state. 
This could be accomplished through careful study of the Koran and Hadith and the writings of 
famous Sino-Muslim literati and Han kitab contributors such as Wang Daiyu, Ma Zhu, and Liu 
Zhi.
72
 The first new-style mosque school dated back to 1898 in Changde, Hunan province, 
followed in 1905 by the School of Muslim Sources (Muyuan xuetang) in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu 
province. Both accepted Muslim and non-Muslim pupils. In 1907, the ahongs (imams) of 
Beijing’s Ox Street mosque Wang Haoran (1848-1919) and Da Pusheng (1874-1965) formed the 
Huijiao Pedagogical Institute (Huijiao shifan xuetang) to provide teacher training, with Koran 
studies in Arabic and lessons on Chinese literary history.
73
  
Sino-Muslim intellectuals also founded their own newspapers, most notably Beijing’s 
Zhengzong aiguo bao (Orthodox Patriot) in 1904 and Tianjin’s Zhuyuan baihua bao (Zhuyuan 
                                                          
71
 Huang Zhenpan, “Zongjiao yu jiaoyu zhi guanxi” (The Relationship Between Religion and Education) in Xing Hui 
Pian, 14.  
72
 Masumoto Masumi, “Rationalizing Patriotism Among Muslim Chinese,” 122.  
73
 For a survey of Sino-Muslim intellectuals’ modernist efforts in the late Qing and Republican China, see Aubin, 
“Islam on the Wings of Nationalism,” 241-272. Also see Ma Shouqian, “The Hui People’s New Awakening from the 
end of the 19th Century to the Beginning of the 20th Century.” 
35 
 
Vernacular) in 1907 by the brothers Ding Baochen (1875-1914) and Ding Zhuyuan (1869-1935). 
Together with Shenyang’s Xingshi baihua bao (founded by Zhang Ziqi in 1909), they were 
called the “Big Three” of Hui vernacular newspapers (Huihui san da baihua bao) by later 
Chinese historians. Publishing articles on a broad range of topics, they explored potential 
remedies to China’s current problems, from ending political corruption to increasing female 
education and establishing representative legislatures.
74
  
In a 1907 article, Ding Zhuyuan lamented the spirit of disunity, dispassion, and distance 
that existed between China’s government and its people: “China historically has not allowed 
ordinary citizens (shimin) to comment on affairs of state, and citizens observe noninterference in 
state affairs as their duty. Hence, although our country’s people are numerous, those who have 
ideas on national affairs are few. Over the course of time, this resulted in the dynasty is the 
dynasty, the state is the state, the official is the official, the [common] people are the people. 
Each fails to consult the others; each fails to protect the others…The people lack a central brain; 
the government lacks limbs.”75 Ding expressed reservation over the Qing court’s tepid steps 
toward constitutionalization. He worried that the promises of a representative national assembly, 
greater political participation and freedom of speech were only empty gestures. Ding then voiced 
the mission of Zhuyuan baihua bao, arguing that newspapers functioned as public forums and 
unofficial, miniature legislative assemblies (yiyuan), disseminating multiple opinions and ideas 
and letting them permeate throughout society. Once these opinions were expressed, it would be 
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hard to contain them. Within the pages of his newspaper, Ding promised to publish articles on all 
matters relating to society and country and let the readers debate their merits.
76
 
Intellectuals like Ding perceived the lack of an organizational structure that could best 
harness the collective energy of a community, in this case the national population, and lend 
weight to diverse opinions. The same concern was extended to the widely-dispersed Muslim 
community in China, as Sino-Muslims began creating new Islamic associations to connect with 
peers. As in the case with new-style schools, the hope was to expand from local organizations to 
one with national reach, though this goal proved difficult to achieve given scarce resources.  
The Qing government abolished China’s thousand-year-old civil service examination and 
Confucian schooling system in 1905, further driving students and scholars to turn to other 
channels and set up new networks for social and educational advancement. Zhenjiang resident 
Tong Cong (1864-1923), a Muslim in his forties who had graduated from the imperial exam 
system at the xiucai, or county level, only a year before its abolishment, founded in 1906 one of 
the earliest Chinese Islamic associations, the “General Association for the Education of the 
Muslim People of Eastern Asia” (Dongya Mumin jiaoyu zonghui, later Dongya Qingzhen jiaoyu 
zonghui). Receiving support from local Muslim elites, Tong aimed to improve Sino-Muslim 
education, opening the School of Muslim Sources along with a publishing house for his journal 
Yiwobao (To Develop Us). Starting in 1908, Tong called his supporters to create branches of his 
association everywhere, although the actual reach of his association remained limited and 
provincial.
77
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The Islamic Educational Association of [Chinese Foreign Students] in Tokyo 
Despite the limited reach of his organization, Tong Cong was in touch with Sino-Muslim 
students studying abroad in Japan and inspired them to model their 1907 Islamic Educational 
Association of [Chinese Foreign Students] in Tokyo (Liudong Qingzhen jiaoyu hui) after his. 
Thirty-six Muslim students from fourteen Chinese provinces comprised the association, 
including one woman and one ahong. They studied some of the most advanced subjects of the 
times—such as engineering, commercial shipping, political economy, railway technology, 
pedagogy, and medicine—countering Han stereotypes of the backwards, uneducated Hui who 
only engaged in petty trading.
78
 While in Tokyo, these students’ perceptions of being both 
Chinese and a part of an international Islamic community grew as they encountered Muslims 
from the Middle East.
79
 
In terms of political affiliation, the Islamic Educational Association in Tokyo was 
representative of the division of affinities within China. Some students maintained ties to the 
dynasty while others shared sympathies with revolutionary groups. The association enjoyed 
financial support from the Qing envoy to Japan Yang Shu (1844-1917), a Guangzhou Muslim 
and uncle to member Yang Dianbiao.
80
 His backing lent the organization legitimacy in the eyes 
of the government, while the overseas environment granted members more freedom to criticize 
the Qing institution. Multiple association members belonged to Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary 
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Alliance (Tongmenhui), which promoted reviving China through expelling the Qing government 
and establishing a republican state. Heavily influenced by the Tongmenhui’s racial and 
nationalist discourse, these members actively sought to legitimize Sino-Muslims as Han Chinese, 
the population most capable of ushering in this revival.   
Revolutionary members included association secretary Huang Zhenpan (1873-1942), 
cahier Zhao Zhongqi (1878-1970), and Liu Qing’en (1869-1929).81 Huang, who studied political 
science and economics at Waseda University, enjoyed a career in law and was elected vice 
president of the Shanghai Bar Association on May 1914, serving in the post for one year.
82
 Liu 
and Zhao both entered military careers. Hailing from Sichuan, Tokyo Imperial Academy student 
Liu Qing’en (T.E. Liu) had participated in an overseas student debate in 1904 where he argued in 
favor of revolution rather than constitutional monarchy.
83
 In addition to Japan, he traveled 
abroad to Germany and the United States, developing an interest in firearms technology and 
creating the semi-automatic “Chinese Liu rifle,” a first for China, in 1915 as head of the 
Hanyang Arsenal. Graduating from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy in 1909, Zhao became 
an instructor in the Baoding Military Academy before transferring to Shanghai in 1911, where he 
participated in the Xinhai Revolution to overthrow the Qing dynasty. In 1914, he returned to his 
native Yunnan and continued serving in military office.
84
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Heading the association was Yunnan native Bao Tingliang, a law student at Hosei 
University who spent seven years abroad in Japan.  After returning to China, Bao wrote 
extensively on Chinese constitutional law, authoring a 1910 book On the Qing Constitution. He 
joined local representatives such as the Zhejiang assembly’s Chen Jingdi and Shen Junru in 
criticizing the Qing court’s “Law on Associations and Assembly” (Jie she ji hui lǜ), enacted on 
March 1908, for its restrictions on the freedom of assembly.
85
 Restrictions were especially heavy 
for political associations, with those advocating for constitutional monarchy treated more 
leniently while those arguing for greater reforms faced tighter controls such as a size cap of one 
hundred members. Bao especially critiqued the restrictions placed against teacher and student 
groups, writing, “Today those who understand law and politics largely work in education. If this 
restriction is added, it will be a huge obstacle to the development of political parties.”86 
Awakening the Hui 
In 1908, the Islamic Educational Association published the first independently Sino-
Muslim-run journal, Xing Hui Pian (Awakening the Hui), which featured articles from both the 
Sino-Muslim population abroad in Japan and back in China.
87
 It also included one article from a 
non-Muslim Chinese. Addressing predominantly a Chinese Muslim audience, the journal 
broadcasted the association’s goals, which were an amalgam of patriotic ideals popular among 
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the Chinese student population in Japan and Islamic revivalist thought. Major topics included 
strategies for strengthening the Chinese nation and people, Islamic reform, and the establishment 
of a new, universal education system for Hui communities. The pamphlet was distributed free of 
charge and mailed back to various provinces in China. Despite ending after one issue, Xing Hui 
Pian established several important rhetorical and thematic arguments that would influence later 
conceptualizations of Hui identity.  
Writers in Xing Hui Pian maintained that the Muslims in China never consisted of only 
one minzu, making “Hui” a religious rather than a nationality label.88 Even the periodical’s lone 
non-Muslim contributor, Li Shaoshan, focused more on the religious (zongjiao) rather than the 
ethnic (minzu) nature of the Hui through a comparison of Huijiao and Confucianism, though he 
never directly tackled the debate.
89
 Sino-Muslim intellectuals sought to equate Islam with other 
universal religions, writing that just as they did not see the Buddhist or Christian populations in 
China becoming one nationality, Muslims also did not belong to one pure nationality (fei 
danchun zhi minzu), a fact proven by the diversity of Muslims around the world.
90
 It would be a 
mistake to believe that all Muslims in China belonged to one minzu simply on the basis that 
Islam has reached the Uighurs (Huihe) and Islamic tribes (Huibu) in China’s Northwest.91 
Stressing Islam’s power as a religion to unite different races into one group with a common 
origin and goal, Bao Tingliang wrote: 
China's races (zhongzu) can be divided into Manchu, Han, Hui, Mongolian, Tibetan, Yi, 
Miao, and more. Each has its own complicated relationships. Our religion, other than [the 
Muslims] in Xinjiang, does not belong to purely one race (fei chunran weiyi zhongzu). 
There are people from the Manchu, Han, Monglian, Tibetan, Yi, Miao, and other groups 
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who have adopted our religion. Through deeply engaging in religion, people can forget 
that originally they were not of one race. Through adopting the same religion, they 
become the Hui people (Huiren) and share the same origin. Even though our religion and 
country are made of different races, the most important part is that we face the same 
external world and our internal differences are but what we have attributed to ourselves. 




By emphasizing the “multi-racial” nature of the category Hui and the “multi-racial” 
nature of China, Bao portrayed the Hui as a microcosm of the country, following a strategy to 
establish Hui as genealogically and culturally “Chinese.” Yet in trying to subtly highlight the 
Muslims within the interior as the key embodiment of this advanced multicultural, Chinese ideal, 
Bao contradicted his argument that all Huiren shared the same origins. By contrasting the “multi-
racial” Sino-Muslims with the “mono-racial” Turkic Muslims in the Northwest, namely Xinjiang, 
Bao worked to distance Sino-Muslims from the country’s other Muslim groups.  
Despite fashioning the Hui as a broad category including all Muslims in China, Xing Hui 
Pian intellectuals also sowed the seeds of exclusion, laying the rhetorical groundwork for the 
future ethnic division of China’s Muslim groups. They argued that Turkic Muslims such as the 
Huihe or present-day Uighurs, while part of the larger community of “Huijiao” or Islamic 
believers, were decidedly non-Han since they (unlike Chinese Muslims) only lived on the 
outskirts of “China Proper” and spoke a foreign tongue. Huang Zhenpan, who penned the Xing 
Hui Pian editorial, made sure to note that he was addressing the Chinese-speaking Muslims 
living “within the limits of the Heilung River in the north, the Tianshan mountains in the west, 
and the seas of the east and the south,”93 leaving other Muslim groups out of the conversation. 
Another writer, Zhao Zhongqi, distanced these Chinese-interior Muslims from Xinjiang Muslims 
by categorizing them as vastly outnumbering the latter, with a population of above 80 million (an 
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overestimate) and with advanced education.
94
 This demarcation and spatial rending was not 
limited to Xing Hui Pian writers. Other Sino-Muslim intellectuals, such as Tianjin journalist 
Ding Zhuyuan, reiterated that Islam was undeniably a religion, not a nationality. Muslims living 




Defending Sino-Muslim Identity Through Origin Myths 
Just as the rise of Chinese nationalism resulted in the propagation of purist myths 
concerning the Han Chinese’s common descent from the Yellow Emperor,96 the rise of Chinese 
Muslim nationalism resulted in a return to Ming and Qing Sino-Muslim origin myths, 
recalibrated to support a kind of Sino-Muslim purism. Though these origin myths had been in 
circulation among China’s Islamic communities as part of an oral tradition, Sino-Muslim literati 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were the first to propagate the myths in written 
word, incorporating them into the Sino-Muslim historiography.  
One popular myth, “Origins of the Hui” (Huihui yuanlai), was first recorded in 1712 by 
Sino-Muslim scholar Liu Sanjie. In the myth, the Tang emperor Taizong (599-649) dreamt one 
night that the roof of his palace was collapsing. Just as a beam threatened to fall on him, a man in 
a green robe and white turban appeared and blocked it. When the emperor asked his officials to 
interpret his dream, the official Xu Mao answered that the dream meant the Tang empire was in 
danger and in need of Muslims from the Western Islamic lands for defense. Taizong sent envoys 
to Arabia to ask for a delegation of Muslims to come to China and assist the Tang. A companion 
of the Prophet Muhammad, Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqas, led a delegation to China. Determining that 
Islam was compatible with Confucianism, Taizong allowed the delegation to settle down, build 
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mosques, and intermarry with Chinese women. The Prophet Muhammad also permitted the 
delegation to stay in China, instructing members to fulfill their mission in China and to keep 
alive their Islamic tradition. Later generations of Sino-Muslims were the direct descendants of 
the delegation members and their Chinese wives.
97
 
Crafted as a “communal biography,” Huihui yuanlai and similar Chinese Islamic legends 
propagated during the Qing endowed Sino-Muslims with a timeless mission to protect the great 
Chinese empire, augmenting their place within the state. By portraying them as descendants of 
Muslims who came to China not only with the blessing of the Prophet Muhammad but also the 
express invitation of the Chinese imperial court, the myths validated their dual Chinese and 
Muslim identities. Furthermore, Sino-Muslim legends drew parallels between Muhammad and 
Confucius, depicting both as great sages. The integration of Islam and Confucianism positioned 
the Muslim literati as important members of both the Chinese Confucian literati and Islamic 
elite.
98
 The myths also borrowed from Buddhist traditions, using the dream motif common in 
Chinese Buddhist origin myths. An account of the journey of Waqqas, recorded on the plaque in 
front of a tomb dedicated to him in Guangzhou’s Huaisheng Mosque and in a nineteenth-century 
travelers’ guide to major Chinese Islamic tomb sites, portrayed him as a figure similar to the 
Tang monk Xuanzang who traveled to India to bring Buddhist scripture back to Emperor 
Taizong. Sent on a mission by the Prophet Muhammad to reveal Koranic scripture to China, 
Waqqas arrived in Chang’an and so impressed Taizong with his “great depth of learning” and 
moral virtue that the emperor built a Great Mosque for Waqqas and his attendants. Other 
versions of this story emphasized Waqqas’s allegiance to the Tang court rather than a foreign 
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power. In these versions, it was Taizong, not Muhammad, who sent Waqqas on his quest to bring 
Islamic scripture to China.
99
 
The writers of Xing Hui Pian utilized this origin myth to establish the Sino-Muslims as 
genealogically and historically “Chinese,” as well as to stress that Muslims entered China and 
became Chinese through peaceful, legitimate means—namely through government sanction, 
intermarriage, and a history of gradual conversion. Defining Sino-Muslims based on the Huihui 
yuanlai, Huang presented the myth as if it was fact and even revised the story to imply that the 
ancestors of Sino-Muslims were fully Han: 
Ever since Muhammad, praise be to him [xuzhi], sent his envoys to China in the year 628 
A.D., the second year of the Tang Zhenguan emperor, there were many people in the 
Northern provinces and southern provinces that believed in his teaching. By now the 
Chinese people who entered the Hui teaching [zhongguo ru Huijiao zhe] have increased 
to a multitude. From this we can see that the Teaching [Islam] was not transmitted from 





Rather than being members of the foreign Muslim delegation, the ancestors of Sino-
Muslims were Han Chinese who came into contact with the delegation and voluntarily converted 
to Islam, becoming Hui through this process. Stressing that this history of Islam in China proves 
that the religion did not simply belong to the Huihe and Huibu, Huang employed the myth as a 
tool to, once again, create a distinction between Sino and Turkic Muslims.  
The origin myth made multiple appearances within Xing Hui Pian, each time presented as 
historic truth. Writing on the origins of Chinese Islam, Zhao Zhongqi emphasized that Huijiao 
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entered China “not through war but through peace, not through force but through natural means.” 
He used the myth to explain the characteristics of modern day Sino-Muslims, such as their 
diaspora across the Chinese interior, writing, “Taizong sanctioned the construction of a mosque 
in Xian province and allowed three thousand Hui soldiers to stay in China, who were used in 
different provinces as soldiers. Thus, today we find Huijiao in several different provinces.” As 
these soldiers settled among the multiple provinces and married Chinese wives, the Sino-Muslim 
population grew over the years. Zhao added a linguistic strategy to establish these Muslims’ 
acculturation and evolution toward “Chineseness,” explaining, “When the Hui first entered 
China, their last names were different, but today they have regular Chinese surnames.”101 
Interested in how Japan’s martial spirit and tradition, in the form of bushido, enabled the island 
nation to become a modern military power, another writer Wang Tingzhi cited the Tang’s 
request for an Islamic army to help the dynasty as proof of the Muslim martial tradition, 
signifying their ability and commitment to protecting the country.
102
 
Saving Country, Saving Faith 
 In order to argue for their inclusion within the Chinese nation, Sino-Muslims worked to  
demonstrate that they were active citizens contributing to its cause. Ding Zhuyuan urged his 
fellow Muslims to see themselves as Chinese citizens (Zhongguo de guomin) and argued that 
once their country strengthened, their religion would follow suit. Equating love of country with 
love of Islam, he proclaimed in 1908 that “to protect the country [guo] means precisely to protect 
the teaching [jiao-Islam]; to love the country is to love oneself” and that “in China no matter 
what teaching [one follows], [all] are Chinese people, [and must] work hard with one heart to 
preserve the great cause of the nation [guojia dashi]. If there is no nation [mei le guo], how can 
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the teaching be preserved?” 103 In Xing Hui Pian, Bao Tingliang warned that the Hui religion 
was “hanging on by a thread” due to a Chinese Muslim population deficient in its knowledge of 
how to modernize and protect its race (jinhua baozhong zhi dao que yan). He posited the same 
call to action, asking, “A nation and its people are closely connected…my peers [fellow Hui] are 
also a part of China, how can you not care about the country and be self-defeating and place 
yourself on the outside [not be involved]?” 104  
The above cries for action linked the fate of China’s Muslims to the fate of the country 
itself. If China failed to adapt, remaining on its current path toward repeated subjugation by 
stronger powers, the Hui community within its borders would, by extension, also come under 
attack. Rather than sit idle, Chinese Muslims had reason to invest themselves in the national 
mission, to join the charge to become equipped and educated in the necessary skills for survival. 
Sino-Muslim intellectuals critiqued the current Hui community in China as being too insulated 
and caught in traditional, outdated modes of thinking. One prime example was the Hui’s “narrow” 
educational focus on mainly classical religious texts without also incorporating new scholarship 
and subjects such as science and mathematics.  
While critiquing this traditional education for providing only basic knowledge to train 
ahongs but not a citizen’s education to help Muslims contribute to the nation,105 Sino-Muslim 
intellectuals nevertheless refuted the idea that Islam itself was a conservative, backwards practice 
that would impede modernization. To the contrary, it possessed immense potential to facilitate 
modernization. China’s Muslims had lost touch with Islam’s original reformist ideals and needed 
to return to them. Pointing to Islam’s numerous contributions to the world, these intellectuals 
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argued that Sino-Muslims, in harnessing this energy, could contribute to China as well. Saving 
the faith became intimately intertwined with saving the country. 
Yet how exactly would Sino-Muslims save the nation while also reviving their religion’s 
capacity for modernity?  Wang Tingzhi offered one answer. Using the term “bushido” (wushidao) 
in a more generalized sense, as a system of military discipline, ability, and solidarity, Wang 
portrayed Muslims (Huijiao zhe) as the creators of an Islamic “way of the warrior” stemming 
back to the time of Muhammad. He mentioned the key battles of Muhammad’s campaign against 
the Banu Quraish merchant tribe of Mecca and his success in unifying the Arabian Peninsula, 
arguing that Sino-Muslims as the inheritors of Muhammad’s teachings possessed the innate 
qualities to defend China.
106
 While Muslims in China were stereotypically perceived as violent 
and treated with suspicion, Sino-Muslim modernists like Wang adopted a strategy of inverting 
these old stereotypes and turning them into positive attributes, replacing derogatory terms such 
as “fierce and brutal” with the concepts of “martial tradition” and “discipline.”107  
Working in tandem with this emphasis on their military capabilities, Sino-Muslim 
intellectuals also depicted Islam as a religion that had encouraged reform and learning since its 
very inception. They worked to promote the idea “that a good Muslim was intrinsically a perfect 
citizen,”108 a valued asset to China’s modernization efforts. Ma Zongsui saw Islam as the product 
of Muhammad’s improvements to Jewish and Christian scripture. Its development, therefore, 
ushered in a “new age of reform and modernization for the religious world.” Muhammad 
changed old prejudices and, under his wisdom and ability, improved people’s habits, established 
a theological-political government, and achieved unification and peaceful governance. Spreading 
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throughout the Middle East to India and the Southeast Asian islands, this transformative power 
of Islam allowed it to cross borders and assert itself as a true world religion, at its peak even 
challenging Europe.
109
 Islam was not a superstition but a modern religion, with a universal power 
matching that of Christianity’s spread in the West and Buddhism’s spread beyond India.110 While 
superstitious religions deluded believers into worshipping false idols like the sun, moon and stars, 
the elements, and beasts, leaving the people crude, Muhammad enlightened the people “as both a 
jun [a person of high character, a model of morality] and a shi (teacher). He showed that 
polytheism was false and monotheism true.” 111  
Calling Muhammad the foremost of all religious reformers, Huang Zhenpan offered a 
similar narrative in his brief account of the Prophet’s accomplishments, arguing that there was no 
reason for conservative factions of Muslims to oppose reform when considering the example of 
Muhammad.
112
 Noting that European civilization traced its roots to ancient Greece, Huang 
delved into the history of Islamic civilization, recording the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) and 
its conquest of the Middle East, North Africa, and Spain.
113
 The advancement of Islamic and 
Arabic knowledge in areas such as astronomy, anatomy, medicine, and architecture spread to 
Europe and influenced Christian academicians, and its reach even led some scholars to 
acknowledge that “Islamic learning has become the world’s teacher.” To lend credibility to the 
stature of Islam, Huang added that in Meiji Japan, books on the history of world civilizations and 
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The cover of Xing Hui Pian contained an Arabic title for the journal in addition to its 
Chinese name. The Arabic read Istiqaz al-Islam (Awakening of Islam), showing the clear link 
between the goals to reform not only the Hui people but worldwide Islam.
115
 For the first two 
decades of the twentieth century, Turkey was a key source of inspiration for Sino-Muslims as a 
center of modern Islamic reform and learning.
116
 The Young Turk movement led by university 
students, which succeeded in restoring the Ottoman parliament and ushering in the empire’s 
Second Constitutional Era in 1908, presented one possibility of what Sino-Muslim intellectuals 
could achieve if they were to come together and lead the country’s Muslims in a concerted effort 
for change. Maintaining that “religions have the power to transform society,” Mainland 
contributors Cheng Du and Cai Dayu pointed to Turkey entering its crisis with the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire and the threat of Western imperialism in jumpstarting its own strengthening 
efforts,
117
 while Huang Zhenpan wrote approvingly of the Islamic states’ establishment of 
modern educational institutions, counting seventeen universities with thousands of disciples.
118
  
Applying the basic concept of evolution to religion, Huang urged Huijiao in China to 
enact changes such as easing restrictions on scripture readings, studying foreign languages to 
translate Turkish, Egyptian, and other academic texts, building libraries, and encouraging 
physical exercise. China and its Muslims needed to learn from foreign states, where religion and 
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the virtues it imparted served to promote learning and science, as well as to arouse the sentiments 
of the people and give them a spirit of resistance, thus serving to strengthen the state. Achieving 
this function would cement Islam as a “civilized religion” (wenming zongjiao) and propel it to 
the next stage, as a “spirited religion” (jingshen zongjiao).119  
Non-Muslim contributor Li Shaoshan described human history as an evolution from 
archaic times to a nomadic age and, finally, to the modern period of states (guojia). His 
suggestions for Huijiao reform ran along the similar veins of establishing a modern curriculum, 
forming education associations, and publishing periodicals to disseminate ideas. The most 
striking part of Li’s article is the connection he tried to make between religion and 
constitutionalism, based on his interpretation of the West’s experience. He framed it as another 
evolution, where religious superstition gave way to religious wars, which eventually gave way to 
constitutionalism. Li believed that “China did not enjoy religion’s benefits but also avoided 
religion’s disasters,” with monarchical power (junquan) established early and facing less 
challenges. This led to the present disadvantage of strong state resistance to constitutionalism.
120
   
Lamenting that “Our country’s people lost what can be counted as their religion—as 
Confucianism lost its true principles and as Huijiao lost its original spirit, the Chinese people did 
not enjoy the power of constitutional rule,” Li saw Confucianism and Islam as both integral parts 
of China’s religious tradition, but both had strayed from their true purposes. He advocated for 
promoting religion’s “spirit” in tangent with enlightening China’s thought in areas such as ethics, 
science, inventions, and law. Reforming Huijiao became one of the first phases in setting up a 
constitutional people.
 121
 In other words, the Hui reform movement impacted more than just 
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religion. It would have positive spillover effects for China. One needed to look no further than 
the constitutionalist efforts being brought to Turkey by young Muslims.  
While the use of origin myths tied Sino-Muslims to the history of Chinese civilization, 
the accounts of Muhammad, the spread of Islam, and the Islamist modernist movement in the 
Middle East also connected Sino-Muslims to the history of Islamic and Arabic civilization. Sino-
Muslim intellectuals carefully crafted this historiography so that the Islamic empire’s 
accomplishments became their accomplishments, with a tradition of learning and a reform-
minded outlook that made them valuable as citizens to China. Similar to the Muslim Confucian 
literati who created the Han kitab texts and argued that Islamic tradition could reside along with 
and even improve Chinese tradition, these late-Qing modernists argued that Islamic and Hui 
“awakening” could reside along with and even improve China’s “awakening.” Their identity and 
role as citizens entailed participating in both.  
Closing Remarks 
Chinese Hui historian Ma Shouqian called the early group of Sino-Muslim reformers “a 
group of vanguard Hui intellectuals” who worked toward the general awakening of the Hui 
people.
122
 Responding to the sociopolitical climate of the late Qing, they grappled with what it 
meant to be a Muslim citizen in an emerging Chinese nation and how to define and shape their 
racial and religious identities. While Sun and Chinese revolutionaries marketed themselves as a 
kind of vanguard to lead all of China into enlightenment and modernization, Sino-Muslim elites 
attempted to carve a similar kind of leadership role within the Muslim population. Their 
strategies centered on selectively highlighting the traits that made them, as Sino-Muslims, 
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uniquely suitable for strengthening the nation. They also legitimized Sino-Muslims within the 
broad histories of Islam and China. The carrier of two traditions, they would be active 
participants in reforming both religion and nation.  
Hui referred to a universal religion (Islam) made up of a racially-diverse population of 
believers, not to a nationality. Through emphasizing the universality of Hui and refusing to 
associate it with one particular race or country, Sino-Muslims established that being Hui did not 
negate being Chinese. This universality also connected Sino-Muslims to the larger Islamic 
community, both at home and abroad. In order to bolster their own “Chinese” credentials, 
however, Sino-Muslim intellectuals juxtaposed themselves against an “other,” with a discourse 
that focused on distancing Sino-Muslims residing in China Proper from the Turkic Muslims in 
the Northwest, namely the Uighurs or Huihe, who were racially “less Chinese.” They maintained 
that Turkic Muslims were one separate race while Sino-Muslims dispersed across the interior 
shared both foreign Muslim and Han Chinese ancestry. Citing their origin myth as proof, they 
identified Sino-Muslims as the descendants of either Chinese converts or the Islamic soldiers 
who came to defend China in the Tang dynasty and later intermarried with Chinese women. 
What resulted was an ambiguous definition of Sino-Muslims that presented them, on the one 
hand, as Muslim Han and, on the other hand, as the embodiment of the Hui multicultural minzu 
ideal.  
In 1911, a series of grievances, revolts, and uprisings against the Qing snowballed out of 
the government’s control. Known collectively as the Xinhai Revolution, these events ushered in 
the fall of China’s last dynasty and the rise of a new republican government led by Yuan Shikai 
(1859-1916).
123
 Throughout the coming Republican era, Sino-Muslims continued to debate 
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whether all Muslims in China should be defined as one unique nationality or if they should be 
considered as racially different while sharing one common religion. The Xing Hui Pian 
representation of Hui, with its emphasis on a racial difference but a religious commonality 
between Turkic and Sino-Muslims, would be tested in this new political environment.        
The next chapter will explore how the construction of Hui identity and history progressed 
in the Republican period, from the beginnings of the Yuan government to the war-torn years of 
the 1930s Nationalist regime. Where there was change, there was also continuity. Just as late-
Qing Sino-Muslim intellectuals were influenced by their predecessors in the Confucian literati, 
their own conceptualizations and strategies would influence Republican-era thinkers.  
Even as Huizu became a nationality encompassing all Muslims in China, cleavages 
remained. Sino-Muslims still saw themselves as more acculturated, more socioeconomically and 
intellectually advanced than Turkic Muslims. Through the essays in Xing Hui Pian, Sino-Muslim 
intellectuals tried to link themselves with the larger history of Muslim and Arabic civilization. 
This universal aspect of Islam, mixed with a territorially-bound identity and loyalty to China, 
continued to hold resonance as Sino-Muslims sought to play a crucial role in Republican China’s 
domestic and foreign affairs. By the 1930s, when Sino-Muslim delegations traveled to Middle 
Eastern countries to solicit support for China’s war effort amidst the Second Sino-Japanese War, 
Sino-Muslim intellectuals were actively using their universal link with the worldwide Muslim 
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Chapter 3: Leaders of China’s Muslim Nationality—Sino-Muslim Identity in the Early 
Republican Era 
Mongolians, Hui, and Tibetans cannot leave the Republic of China (Zhonghua Minguo)…Mongolians, Hui, and 
Tibetans will share equal power with Manchus and Han pertaining to elections and qualifications to run for office. 
Everyone has the power to elect the president and everyone has the power to be elected as president. There is no 
discrimination against the frontier (bianchui qishi) or absurd racial theories (zhongzu miushuo). 




Following the Wuchang uprising and the end of the Qing dynasty, the ethnic minority-
heavy areas of Tibet and Outer Mongolia, as well as several Chinese interior provinces, declared 
their independence. China’s frontier territories, including the Muslim-populated Northwest, 
faced the threat of foreign annexation from imperial powers. The newly-founded Republic of 
China (Zhonghua minguo) was heading for disintegration even as it was being created. 
Addressing the threat of territorial loss and political fragmentation, the Republican government 
downplayed racial and ethnic differences, dialing back the anti-Manchu, pro-Han rhetoric in 
favor of calls for the unity and equality of rights amongst China’s major nationalities. It turned to 
a modified version of the five-bloc, multiethnic Qing hierarchical structure, officially becoming 
the “Chinese Republic of Five Lineages” (Zhonghua wuzu gonghe). 
For the next two decades following Xing Hui Pian, political pressure and competition, 
compounded with the complex questions surrounding legitimacy and representation, influenced 
Sino-Muslim intellectuals and the early Republican state to include Sino-Muslims under the 
“Huizu” label, treating Huizu as one ethnic group encompassing all Muslims in China and a key 
component of Zhonghua wuzu gonghe. Official publications and national Hui associations 
worked to reinforce this politically-expedient construct and secure Muslim loyalty to the republic. 
Realizing that they would receive greater prominence and political representation as leaders of 
the Huizu than as Muslim Han, Sino-Muslim elites took full advantage of their membership 
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within the Huizu. At the same time, they continued to differentiate between Sino and Turkic 
Muslims, highlighting the former as a more acculturated, socioeconomically and intellectually 
advanced group, to promote the vision of a Sino-Muslim leadership that could act on behalf of 
all Muslims in China and incorporate them into the new Chinese nation. 
A Republic is Born: the Xinhai Revolution and its Aftermath 
In its final years, the Qing struggled to preserve power and prestige against mounting 
criticism. The imperial court had to demonstrate willingness to fulfill its promise of 
constitutionalization even while moderating the reform’s pace and scope. Empress Dowager 
Cixi’s death in November 1908 removed a key emblem of Qing authority and left the arduous 
task of governance to the regents of the three-year-old Xuantong emperor (Puyi, 1906-1967). 
Following the nine-year calendar established by Cixi a month before her death, provisional 
provincial and national assemblies convened, respectively, in 1909 and 1910. In a show of 
dissatisfaction with Qing policy and the court’s increasing loss of control over the situation, the 
assemblies successfully pressured the imperial court to shorten the timeline to full 
constitutionalization by four years, from 1917 to 1913. Miscalculations by the regents, including 
the assignment of a predominantly-Manchu cabinet in 1911, only further fomented suspicion 
among the Chinese regarding Qing commitment to reform. The Railway Protection Movement in 
1911, centered in Sichuan, protested against the nationalization of two major railways and pitted 
local elites against the central government over ownership and control of profits. Organizations 
like the Revolutionary Alliance remained active and eager to oust the dynasty.  
Amidst this tense environment, the 1911 Xinhai Revolution started by accident in the city 
of Wuchang on October 10, when a gunpowder explosion alerted Qing authorities to the 
presence of local revolutionary groups. Facing arrest and execution, the rebels acted out of 
56 
 
desperation and succeeded in overpowering the local garrison. The imperial New Army troops, 
infiltrated by the Revolutionary Alliance and stationed in Wuchang and nearby cities in response 
to the railway crisis, staged a mutiny in support of the rebels. Following the success in Wuchang, 
uprisings launched in other cities and multiple provinces declared independence from the Qing.  
The nature of the revolution varied from locality to locality, with most in the form of 
coups d’etat as local elites or military units established temporary military governments. Some 
involved the participation of secret societies and revolutionary organizations while others 
descended into disorder or commemorations of the Ming dynasty and the “restoration” from 
Manchu to Chinese rule. Away in the United States at the revolution’s outbreak, Sun Yat-sen 
(1866-1925) returned to China in Christmas to lead the movement, but it was Yuan Shikai (1859-
1916), as the founder of the New Army and a leading military figure, who became a crucial 
power broker between the Qing military and the revolutionary forces. Striking a compromise 
with Yuan to prevent a protracted civil war and foreign intervention, the revolutionaries agreed 
to give Yuan the presidency in exchange for his help in securing the emperor’s abdication. With 
Puyi’s abdication on February 12, 1912, China entered the process of establishing a new state 
and, for the first time, a republic.
126
  
Muslim troops played important roles in the New Army units of Sichuan, Henan, and 
Shaanxi, one of the earliest provinces to declare secession from the Qing.
127
 Like the rest of the 
country, Sino-Muslim leaders found their loyalties divided, with some fighting to protect the 
dynasty and others fighting on the side of the revolutionary armies. Some switched allegiance 
during the course of the revolution in order to protect their own interests. In Shaanxi, General Ma 
Anliang (1855-1918) commanded Muslim battalions to strike against the revolutionary army of 
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Zhang Fenghui but declared his allegiance to the Republic of China upon learning of Puyi’s 
abdication, convinced he was fighting for a lost cause. Serving as a mediator for Shaanxi 
communities and the new republican government, Ma worked to consolidate his power and 
helped other Muslims to provincial and local offices. Fellow Sino-Muslim general Ma Fuxiang 
(1876-1932), who had served the Qing as military governor to Xining and Altay, joined local 
allies, including non-Muslim elites, to declare independence for the province of Gansu. Yuan 
Shikai rewarded his allegiance by appointing Ma Fuxiang as vice-commander of Ningxia, where 
Ma expanded his power into Inner Mongolia.
128
 The presence of these Sino-Muslim local elites 
in the Northwest, equipped with their own sizeable armies, encouraged the Republican 
government to develop strategies to secure Muslim allegiance. It also provided Sino-Muslim 
communities with influential future patrons to fund and advance their cause. 
The Republican Era and Wuzu Gonghe 
The fledgling republic had to contend with the large degree of political and social 
fragmentation in China, exacerbated by the uneven pace of modernization between rural and 
urban, core and peripheral areas. It grappled with questions of what republicanism meant and 
how to transition from the post-Qing political vacuum to a new government capable of 
preserving territorial sovereignty and uniting its citizens under common interests.
129
 In order to 
establish itself as a legitimate republic, the state had to define and create identities for the 
constituents it claimed to represent in order to incorporate them into the nation. The crisis of 
fragmentation influenced the republican government to downplay racial and ethnic differences. 
They emphasized instead the unity of China’s five major minzu—the Han, the Manchu, the 
Mongols, the Tibetans, and the Hui or Muslims—symbolized by the new five-colored national 
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flag. Even Zhang Binglin (1868-1936) and other previous advocates for an “ethnically pure” Han 
state reversed their rhetoric and promoted the new multi-ethnic “Zhonghua Republic of Five 
Lineages.” Opponents of this new system, including Sun Yat-sen, accepted it out of pressure 




Under the republican system of representation, Sino-Muslim elites were incentivized to 
accept the definition of Huizu under wuzu gonghe, taking advantage of their status as a 
prominent and indispensable member of China’s five major nationalities to augment their 
political clout. This status provided them with an advantage and extra layer of protection at a 
time when China’s religions faced the threat of losing influence under the new regime. Placing 
religious affairs under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, the Republican state was 
confiscating multiple temples to convert into schools. Eager to protect their property and 
interests, all the major religions initiated efforts to redefine their roles and relations with the 
state. They formed centralized associations to represent believers and negotiate with the 
government, endowing themselves with the crucial mission of repairing their religion’s current 
weakness and disunity.  
As part of the broad wave of religious reform sweeping the country, Sino-Muslims were 
one of the many religious groups trying to position themselves as important members of the new 
modern nation and complete an institutional process of secularization, with a central strategy of 
forming national religious associations advocating goals of educational reform. In his study of 
Republican religious associations, Vincent Goossaert singled out the Sino-Muslim community’s 
efforts. He credited their ability to succeed where other religious groups failed, despite sharing 
similar aims, tools, and general rhetoric, to the fact that Muslims were the only group to combine 
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a reinvention of religion with an argument for ethnic nationality status.
 131 
Republican state 
policy explicitly promised to safeguard the rights of its officially-recognized nationality, 
including the Huizu, in areas such as freedom of religion, property rights, representation in the 
national legislature, and upholding the status of local elites.
132 
The Chinese Muslim Progressive Association and Huiwen baihua bao 
Focused on building a sizeable, united Muslim front to increase their political voice, 
organizations such as the Chinese Muslim Progressive Association (Zhongguo Huijiao jujin hui 
or CMPA, est. 1912)—the first centralized, nationwide Muslim association in China—attempted 
to act as a centralized organ for China’s scattered Muslim communities, inviting communities in 
Xinjiang to join while accepting a Sino-Muslim leadership headquartered in Beijing. The CMPA 
charter listed its goals to include the publication of journals and Chinese translations of Islamic 
texts, the establishment of schools and vocational training programs, the completion of surveys 
on the current social conditions of Chinese Muslims, and the advancement of virtues such as 
frugality, hygiene, and nationalism.
133
 With Ministry of Education official Ma Linyi as president, 
the association was able to successfully expand its influence and enjoy official support. Led by 
reformist ahongs with experience abroad in the Middle East, the CMPA reached out to Muslim 
communities throughout the country to encourage the creation of local branches. Their 
subsidiary groups existed in every province and, beginning in 1934, also formed in individual 
mosques. From 1912 to the 1930s, the CMPA published materials to be distributed in Xinjiang to 
educate their Huihe peers on nationalism, citizenship, and republicanism,
134
 drawing a distinction 
                                                          
131
 Goossaert, “Republican Church Engineering,” 209-232. 
132
 “Linshi da zongtong ling” (Order from the Provisional President) in “Fa Ling,” Huiwen baihua bao 1, No. 1 (Jan. 
1913), 3.  
133
 Goossaert, “Republican Church Engineering,” 221. 
134




between the loyal, acculturated Sino-Muslim leadership and the Turkic Muslims in need of its 
guidance.  
Sino-Muslims were actively involved in the editoral board of the Huiwen baihua bao 
(Hui vernacular), an Arabic-Chinese publication of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Committee 
(MTAC, est. 1912) that ran from January 1913 to May 1915, when the committee became 
overwhelmed by its multiple responsibilities and decided to end all three of its bilingual 
publications (Hui, Mongolian, and Tibetan). CMPA leaders and imams Wang Haoran (1848-
1918) and Zhang Ziwen served as chief editors. Announcing China’s unification and the 
establishment of the “Republic of Five Lineages,” the MTAC periodicals served as a propaganda 
tool for the newly-founded Republic of China, targeting audiences in China’s “frontier” regions 
that threatened to establish themselves as independent states. Huiwen baihua bao was mainly 
aimed at promoting republicanism and patriotism amongst Muslims in Xinjiang.  
An interplay existed between the republican government, which desired to secure the 
allegiance and borders of China’s Muslim populations to the republic, and the Sino-Muslim 
intellectuals spearheading propaganda efforts such as the Huiwen baihua bao. These leaders held 
influential positions within the new republican government apparatus and desired to achieve their 
ideal of representing all Hui while emphasizing their loyalty to the state. The state, in turn, 
derived legitimacy from their acknowledgment. Throughout its first issue, the Huiwen baihua 
bao repeated the themes of unity and defined Zhonghua minguo as all the territories belonging to 
the five main nationalities (Hui, Mongolian, Tibetan, Manchu, and Han).
135
 The editors’ opening 
statement began with the declaration, “Mongolians, Hui, and Tibetans, along with Han and 
Manchus, are all descendants of the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi zisun) and are all of excellent 
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nobility (youxiu guizu).”136 In an attempt to placate these strategically important minority groups 
and promise them equal rights as citizens, as well as representation, statements like the above 
departed from the earlier rhetoric adopted by Sun and others that emphasized the Han as the 
descendants of the Yellow Emperor and therefore more legitimately Chinese. Stating that “Under 
the old Manchu Qing system, the Hanzu was completely under their control, not to mention the 
state of Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan and other zu,”137 the Republican regime placed the blame for 
ethnic tensions and prejudices on the late Qing government. They focused on constructing a 
shared plight between China’s five nationalities while implying that the solution was for these 
groups to unite and work collectively under a new, reformed administration.  
The foreword pointedly dismissed “discrimination against the frontier (bianchui qishi) or 
absurd racial theories (zhongzu miushuo).” It went on to acknowledge the proud traditions of all 
five minzu and the great historical figures each has produced, from Genghis Khan for the 
Mongols to Muhammad for the Hui. Lamenting the infighting between nationalities who all 
share a common descent, the editors stressed internal unity in order to combat China’s growing 
susceptibility to external threats and argued that the new republic had the interests of the 
Mongolians, Hui, and Tibetans at heart, noting “If the zu is weak then the home[land] dies (zu 
ruo jia wang)…To protect Mongolians, Hui, and Tibetans is to protect the Republic of China. To 
protect the Republic of China is to protect Mongolians, Hui, and Tibetans.” 138 Just as in the late 
Qing, Chinese Muslims were urged to see their fates as being irrevocably intertwined with that of 
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the state, only this time the state has been reworked to refer to the newly-formed Zhonghua 
minguo.  
To court the allegiance of these ethnic minorities, the MTAC published numerous 
statements and edicts from the central government that guaranteed minority rights. In an October 
23, 1912 “Order from the Provisional President,” Yuan established seven points in the policy 
toward Mongolians, Hui, and Tibetans, including safeguarding their freedom of religion, 
property rights, representation in the national legislature, right to preserving a nomadic lifestyle, 
the status of local elites, and the promise that the government will not treat them as colonized 
subjects (zhimin).
139
 An earlier order on April 13 critiqued the restrictions placed on Manchu-
Han and Mongolian-Han marriages under the Qing regime, neglecting to mention the lifting of 
the ban on Han-Manchu marriage by the Qing court in February 1902. Noting also the rarity of 
Han-Hui and Han-Tibetan marriages, the edict called on people to move beyond past restrictions 
and habits and to encourage more intermarriages and relationships between the five 
nationalities.
140 
Articles also explained the concepts of a constitutional republic and why it was a superior 
form of government compared to monarchism and constitutional monarchism, emphasizing that 
a republic is grounded in the people’s sovereignty through the election of representatives.141 The 
power of representation resonated throughout the publication, as it repeatedly mentioned how 
members of all five nationalities were present during the vote to set up the MTAC and to instate 
the provisional government. Electoral laws for the new republic and for Mongolia, Tibet, and 
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Qinghai populations, outlined in an October 5, 1912 statement, stipulated that ballots and laws 
must be issued in both Hanzi (Chinese) and the local area script.
142
  
All this served to build legitimacy for the new central government and firmly positioned 
groups such as the Mongolians and Hui (and their territorial holdings) under the jurisdiction of 
the Republican regime. To lend further legitimacy, Huiwen baihua bao worked to distance the 
new government from the Qing empire and the MTAC from the Lifan Yuan, the Qing agency 
that handled the empire’s relations with tributary areas and foreign groups such as the Russians, 
Tibetans, and Mongolians. Before the establishment of the Zongli Yamen, it was the closest 
Qing equivalent to a foreign policy department. Huiwen baihua bao portrayed the Lifan Yuan as 
an old, outdated system belonging to the era of monarchism to deal with external affairs and 
outer areas of the empire, while the MTAC represented the republican government’s 
commitment to treating these outer border areas as equals to the interior provinces. Originally, 
Yuan had stipulated that Mongolian, Hui, and Tibetan affairs should fall under the jurisdiction of 
the internal affairs department. Once the internal affairs department became too large and 
unwieldy, overwhelmed by its tasks, the legislature voted to set up MTAC.
143
  
In order to explain the need to set up a special committee to address Mongolian, Tibetan, 
and Hui affairs when the republic already declared that all five nationalities were equal and 
would no longer have any differences amongst them, the MTAC argued that the Mongolian and 
Tibetan culture, economy, and education was not the same as the interior’s. In other words, they 
were less advanced. Therefore, greater action needed to be taken to develop Mongolian and 
Tibetan affairs and bring their development up to speed with the rest of China. The MTAC 
stated: 
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As for Huizu, the circumstances are different. Xinjiang and other areas under the Qing 
already changed into local supreme administrative divisions (xingsheng) with an 
organizational model of provincial government, so there is no need to set up another 
system. Plus, in the Gansu belt, Hui and Han have long lived with each other as 
neighbors with mutual communication and friendship, with a strong atmosphere of 
assimilation (hen you tong hua qi xiang). In the process of creating the republic, the 
Huizu were the first to approve and even contributed to the effort. However, their religion 




The MTAC made a special distinction for the Hui, noting that Muslim groups (especially 
in the areas populated by Sino-Muslims, “the Gansu belt”) already possessed a greater degree of 
assimilation relative to other minority groups but still fell under the MTAC because, like 
Mongolians and Tibetans, they had a separate religion. Therefore, the MTAC could help Hui 
address special matters and concerns that arose from their religious differences. The article 
subtly singled out Sino-Muslims as especially assimilated. While in official communications 
with the government, both Muslims in Xinjiang and in the Chinese interior referred to 
themselves as Huizu, terminology to distinguish between the two remained during the early years 
of the republic. The former were the chanhui (turbaned Hui) while the latter were the Hanhui 
(Chinese Hui).
145
 The existence of “Hanhui” as a description for Sino-Muslims indicates that 
their identity remained ambiguous and flexible. They could still be viewed as Muslim Han even 
as official policy and communications grouped them with Xinjiang Muslims under the umbrella 
term of Huizu. The perception of backwardness for the Mongolians, Tibetans, Turkic Muslims 
meant that the “advanced” Sino-Muslim leadership within the Chinese interior stood out as 
exceptions to the rule. Its role within the MTAC, therefore, was to help guide fellow Muslims 
toward modernization.  
The MTAC returned to the portrayal of the Hui by Sino-Muslim intellectuals and 
reformers of the Xing Hui Pian era, depicting the historically friendly relations between Hui and 
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Han while downplaying the hostile tensions that existed between the two. Portraying the Huizu 
as among the first to approve of the new republic, “Document from all Huizu to President Yuan” 
from February 27, 1912 credited the Hui among those who organized provisional collective 
assemblies to form the national legislature and recognize Yuan as provisional president, stating 
that “The national body (guoti) has already stabilized the Huizu’s patriotism and achieved its 
objective.”146 The “Huimin” leadership that first recognized the Republic largely consisted of the 
Sino-Muslim urban intellectuals who would go on to lead national associations such as the 
CMPA, as well as generals like Ma Anliang who pledged their troops to the new government. 
Their official membership as Huizu, rather than simply Muslim Han, allowed the state to extend 
their allegiance as representative of all Muslims in China.  
The Warlord Era 
Without the Muslims living in China’s contested Northwest, including both Sino and 
Turkic populations, the importance of Sino-Muslims based in the Chinese interior to the 
Republican government would have been greatly reduced. Without Sino-Muslims in the interior 
acting as the representatives of these frontier populations and spearheading efforts to incorporate 
them in the new nation, the Republican government would have had a harder time in 
consolidating power over its Muslim communities. In later years, the CMPA continued to 
posture itself as a promoter of Hui allegiance. Wang Haoran, expressing nationalist sentiments 
on behalf of the organization in January 1914, argued that civil discord between China’s 
nationalities only obstructed national pacification and progress, writing “My dear Muslims, 
listen! Goodwill between Hui and Han is more than golden, yet now relations are in a time of 
turmoil, with poisoned feelings, and are especially veering off the principle of ‘Five 
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Nationalities, One Family’ (‘Wuzu yi jia’ zhi dao). Han, Manchu, Mongolian, and Tibetan are 
like our brothers. Our infighting will turn us into laughingstocks for foreigners.”147  
Yet the early republic was unable to overcome infighting between political and military 
factions. From the years 1916 to 1928, China’s Warlord era, competing military cliques ruled a 
fragmented country, exercising power within their respective fiefs. A group of Muslim warlords 
(Huimin junfa) emerged from the local elite to establish power over strategic areas such as Gansu, 
Ningxia, and Qinghai, building political leverage for Sino-Muslims.
148
 In a twist of irony, Sino-
Muslims, who had been fighting to strengthen their force as a constituency in the early 
Republican state, found their leverage increasing at the very moment when the unity of China 
and its Republican system was breaking down.  
By the end of the tumultuous Warlord Era, Sino-Muslims were a group of increasing 
strategic importance to the state. Non-Muslim warlords such as the “Christian general” Feng 
Yuxiang (1882-1948) found it advantageous to team up with local Sino-Muslim leaders, 
appointing Ma Fuxiang in 1925 as his codirector to defend the northwestern borders. Ma used his 
rapport with Feng to obtain national-level civil and military office, including the post of national 
aviation commander. Sino-Muslims were gaining political leverage, but the battle environment 
of the Warlord Era also exposed those in the Northwest to exploitation by armies eager to wrest 
revenue and manpower for campaigns. Sino-Muslim generals like Ma Zhongying and Ma 
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Tingrang redirected public anger over this exploitation to their advantage in order to oust Feng 
and other rivals. By the time of the Nationalists’ Northern Expedition (1926-1928) campaign to 
end warlord rule, the KMT needed to negotiate with the Muslim warlords in order to secure the 
northwestern frontier and realize its goals for reunification. The influence of these Sino-Muslim 
leaders would last beyond the Warlord Era, as they served in prominent posts in the 1930s 
Nationalist-led regime, often extending their reach by working with reformist intellectuals and 




The new Republican regime established by Chiang Kai-shek in 1928 began 
deemphasizing its predecessor’s Republic of Five Lineages, promoting instead a mono-minzu 
policy that mirrored late Qing Hui intellectuals’ defense of Sino-Muslims as Muslim Han. After 
experiencing the political fragmentation of the Warlord Era, the Republican government wanted 
to solidify the concept of one united “Zhonghua minzu” to consolidate its control over China and 
counter Japanese efforts to create division amongst the country’s minority groups. In some ways, 
Chiang’s mono-minzu policy returned to the Han nationalism of Sun Yatsen. Before passing the 
office to Yuan in March, Sun stressed the link between ethnic and territorial unity in his January 
1912 inaugural speech as provisional president: “The uniting of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui 
and Tibetan territories into a single country also means the uniting of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, 
Hui, Tibetan and other lineages (zu) into a single people (yiren). This you could say is minzu 
unity.”150 The goal, in Sun’s view, was to achieve homogeneity not through forced assimilation 
(qiangxing tonghua) but through a gradual, natural melding (ronghe). The Han-led government 
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should enlighten minority groups through ganhua or “reforming through examples of moral 
superiority,” in the form of improving economic development and education in frontier regions 
such as Tibet and Mongolia.
151
  
Sun’s vision was not wholly incompatible with Sino-Muslim intellectuals’ own 
constructions of Hui identity. Sino-Muslim origin myths and writings by Xing Hui Pian scholars 
long espoused the history and evolution of Muslims in China from “foreign” to “Chinese” as a 
peaceful, gradual melding process. Perceiving themselves as more acculturated and 
socioeconomically and intellectually more advanced than Turkic Muslims, Sino-Muslim elites 
acted as “natural” leaders of the Huizu and felt it was their responsibility to help enlighten and 
incorporate fellow Muslims into the nation.
152
 At the same time, the vision of China’s minorities 
eventually yielding and becoming subsumed into the evolutionally “superior” Hanzu presented a 
threat to Sino-Muslims who feared that it would lead to a loss of their distinct identities and ways 
of life. The early Republican government of the 1910s toned down this threat, returning to the 
Qing’s corporatist model through the Republic of Five Lineages, but it kept the concept of 
“reforming through examples of moral superiority” in its relationships with Tibetans, 
Mongolians, and the Hui. Given the different benefits and disadvantages of the two ethnic 
policies, some Sino-Muslim intellectuals accepted Chiang’s mono-minzu system while others 
preferred their distinctive national identity and opposed KMT efforts to ban Chinese Muslims 
from calling themselves “Huizu.”153 The next chapter will explore how this difference of opinion 
and the climate of Republican power politics contributed to new strategies for Sino-Muslim 
identity construction in the 1930s. 
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Chapter 4: Challenges to the “Republic of Five Lineages” and the Birth of an Independent 
Modern Sino-Muslim Historiography 
A man [geren] has his own record of conduct [fuli], a family [jia] has its genealogy [zupu], a nation [guo] has its 
national history [guoshi]. Chinese Islam has a multitude, [an] infinite number [wuqian wan] of people [min] and one 






Since the onset of Republican China, the strategic importance of Muslim populations 
along border regions allowed for the inclusion of a collective Muslim nationality within the 
“Republic of Five Lineages” (wuzu gonghe). Starting in the 1930s, competition for Hui 
allegiance intensified, propelled along by two key conflicts—the internal power struggle between 
the KMT and its main political rival the CCP and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). 
Amidst this competition, Sino-Muslims gained a greater strategic role and set of alternatives to 
the early republic’s conception of Hui identity. Under the KMT, the Republican state recognized 
Sino-Muslims as Muslim Han. Hui functioned simply as a religious marker. Under the Japanese, 
China’s Muslims collectively formed a Hui nationality in need of emancipation from its Han 
oppressors. Under the CCP, Sino-Muslims gradually became their own separate “Huizu” 
nationality, one oppressed not by the Han but the “Han chauvinism” (Hanzu zhuyi) of the KMT.  
This chapter will examine these competing conceptions of Hui identity and the ongoing 
efforts by Sino-Muslims to develop their identity and historiography during the power politics of 
the later Republican era. It will analyze the new body of Sino-Muslim scholarship that emerged 
during this period. The wartime environment provided the impetus for a prolific outpouring of 
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scholarship that systematically reexamined Sino-Muslim origins, genealogy, history, and culture 
in order to reaffirm their membership within the Chinese nation-state. Marking the emergence of 
a modern historiography, these reexaminations provided ample fodder for Sino-Muslims to 
construct a collective narrative and distinctive identity. Through increasingly giving Sino-
Muslims a separate genealogical and cultural history from the Han Chinese and Turkic Muslims, 
they paved the way for the formation of a separate Hui minzu.  
Huijiao Not Huizu: KMT Mono-minzu Policy 
Even after the KMT ended the Warlord era and reunified China in 1928, the party’s 
position remained tenuous and dependent on the allegiance of regional warlords. Foreign powers 
and rival political factions also competed and negotiated for power with the Republican regime, 
whose political and military capabilities remained too weak to consolidate rule with pure, brute 
shows of force.
155
 In its inaugural year, the Nationalist-led regime, based in the newly-
established capital of Nanjing, replaced the Five-colored Flag of the Republic with the party’s 
“Blue Sky, White Sun, and a Wholly Red Earth” as both a symbol of China’s reunification and 
an assertion of its authority. The changing of the flag also marked a shift for state ethnopolicy. 
Its centerpiece would no longer be the “Republic of Five Lineages.” Instead, the KMT promoted 
a mono-minzu policy that openly challenged the early Republican conception of Huizu. Chiang 
Kai-shek (1887-1975) moved toward organizing all Muslims as Huijiao, a religious group rather 
than a nationality, arguing that “the difference between the Hans and Mohammedans [Huijiao tu] 
is only in religion and different habits of life.”156 The idea was to firmly root Hui identity and 
loyalties to the Chinese Republic, while deemphasizing conflicts between Hui and Han Chinese, 
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by presenting the two groups as essentially one Chinese nationality. In later years, as Japan tried 
to separate Hui allegiance from the KMT state by portraying the Han Chinese as oppressors of 
China’s ethnic minorities, Chiang’s mono-minzu policy acted as a counterargument to the 
Japanese campaign.  
By maintaining that Hui referred to a religion, not a nationality, the KMT policy showed 
the influence of late Qing Sino-Muslim intellectuals, echoing the opening statement of Xing Hui 
Pian editor Huang Zhenpan (1873-1942) from his essay “On the Hui People.”157 If the early 
years of the republic marked a departure from this concept of Hui with the implementation of the 
five-lineage system, Chiang’s ethnopolicy marked a return. Sino-Muslims were not Huizu but 
Han who followed Islam.  
While some Sino-Muslims accepted this mono-minzu policy and their inclusion within 
the Han Chinese majority, others worried over being reduced to a religious minority and wanted 
to protect the political rights they had gained in leading one of the five recognized lineages. 
Preferring to preserve this distinctive national identity, they opposed KMT efforts to ban Chinese 
Muslims from calling themselves Huizu. Xue Wenbo, a teacher at the reformist Beijing Cheng 
Da School and founder of the Beiping Muslim Student Organization, deliberately changed the 
name of his organization to the “Chinese Huizu Youth Organization” in response and became an 
editor to the Huizu Youth journal.
158
 Other intellectuals expressed their opposition to KMT 
ethnopolicy through studies that sought to prove, with historical and genealogical evidence, the 
differences in nationality between Hui and Han.  
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The Development of CCP Hui Ethnopolicy  
Sino-Muslim opposition to the mono-minzu policy paved the way for competing parties 
to offer alternative visions of Hui identity. In their struggle to gain control over China, both the 
KMT and CCP wanted to preserve the Qing empire boundaries. Since this empire was 
multiethnic, with non-Chinese ethnic minorities making up the majority populations in key 
frontier regions, preserving these territories meant winning the support of regional minorities and 
leaders. Through the party’s increased interactions with minority populations, CCP ethnopolicy 
matured over the course of the Chinese Civil War (1927-1950).  
Breaking off the tenuous alliance between the KMT and CCP in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek 
ordered a purge targeting the Communists on April 12. As the civil war escalated, CCP forces 
retreated to the countryside and, over the course of the Long March (1934-1935), traveled 
through highly-concentrated minority areas in Northwest China to relocate their base to Yan’an, 
Shaanxi province.
159
 The Northwest appealed to the CCP due to its distance from the KMT base 
in the capital Nanjing and its proximity to Soviet Russia and Outer Mongolia. Relocation shifted 
the party’s focus to these minority-heavy areas and provided a chance to align with the local 
population. Rather than strictly adhering to a general theory (e.g. Marxist-Leninist doctrine), 
CCP ethnopolicy development chose a pragmatic approach, adapting to the current conditions 
and needs of local Muslim groups.
160
 It adopted a “dialectical view of Islam” as both a “dark 
influence” that stymied the Hui’s “national and class awakening” to join the socialist revolution 
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and “a sacred banner” to unify the Hui in struggles against “tyrannical suppression” (e.g. the 
KMT and Japan).
161
  Originally, the CCP focused on gaining support through amending its 
stance toward religion, promising to protect the Hui’s freedom of worship. The party also 
promised to uphold the principle of self-determination for minority nationalities, establishing in 
1936 the first Hui autonomous region in Tongxin, Southern Ningxia.
162
  
Denouncing the KMT mono-minzu policy as oppressively assimilative and dismissive in 
its treatment of minority nationalities, the embodiment of “Han chauvinism” (Hanzu zhuyi), the 
Communist leadership recognized the existence of a collective Muslim nationality in China, 
essentially maintaining the early Republic’s definition of Huizu. Party documents from the 1920s 
and 1930s (including a 1936 proclamation to the Hui issued under Mao Zedong’s name) revealed 
that, until 1940, the CCP leadership and the Comintern did not distinguish between the Muslims 
living in China proper from those in Xinjiang.
163
  
Impact of the Second Sino-Japanese War 
The buildup and outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) elevated the 
competition for Chinese Muslim allegiance, providing additional impetus for the KMT and CCP 
to launch aggressive and increasingly sophisticated propaganda efforts directed at the Hui 
population. Not only did the invasion threaten China’s national and territorial unity, it also 
adopted a racial and ethnic element, as the Japanese offered yet another interpretation of Hui 
identity. Two lines of arguments regarding Chinese Muslims’ relation to the Chinese state 
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dominated the debate among the Japanese. One extreme sought to establish a Hui separatist state 
similar to the puppet state of Manchukuo. The other followed the Republic of Five Lineages 
inclusion of Huizu into China, arguing that the Hui were the “best part” of the Chinese Republic 
and thus a key to “reviving” the country and incorporating it under Japanese rule. Variations 
between the two extremes also existed, adding to the ambiguity of Hui identity, with proposals 
dividing China’s Muslims into three categories: Hui in the eastern provinces, Hui in the 
Northwest, and Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang. The latter two groups tended to be treated more as 
candidates for separatist Hui states while the former was incorporated within the Chinese state.
164
 
While Japanese pan-Asianists had exhibited interest in Chinese Muslims since the early 
1900s, launching individual attempts to encourage Hui secession, Japan did not enact any official 
Hui Muslim campaigns until after gaining Manchuria in 1931. In order to strengthen their hold 
on Manchuria, Japan had to secure the borders near eastern Inner Mongolia, where Hui warlords 
resided, while also managing a Muslim population numbering more than 300 thousand in the 
Northeast provinces (dong san sheng). 
165
 The Japanese tried to recruit China’s minorities by 
highlighting their differences from the Han Chinese and emphasizing their disenfranchised, 
oppressed existence under Han rule, creating an Islamic league in 1932 in the capital of 
Manchuria as a vehicle to propagate anti-Chinese propaganda. Though Japanese authorities 
disagreed over whether to treat the Hui as a religious or ethnic group, a reorganization of the 
Manchurian Islamic Society (Manzhou Yisilan xiehui) converted it into an official ethnic 
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organization. In Inner Mongolia (Mokyo or Mengjiang), the Northwest Islamic Union (Xibei 
Huijiao lianhe hui) run by Japanese Muslims sought to establish itself as the “autonomous 
authority” (zizhi jiguan) for the Hui and co-opt the region’s Muslim warlords. It likely intended 
on advocating for an independent Hui state (Huijiao guo).  
To gain the allegiance of Chinese Muslims beyond the Northwest, Japan switched tactics, 
following the Republic of Five Lineages concept of a “trans-regional” Huizu tied to the national 
borders of China. It created an even larger organization, the All China Muslim League (ACML, 
Zhongguo Huijiao zonglianhe hui), in 1938 to promote Muslim collaboration with Japan.
166
 
Defining the “whole Muslim population of China” as a Hui minzu “inseparable from its religion,” 
the ACML attacked the CCP as a threat to Chinese Muslim identity due to the party’s 
antagonism toward religion. The organization also attempted to stir up suspicion against the 
KMT by pointing to its alliance with the Communists, discrediting the Nationalists by 
association. Portraying the Hui as “a firm brick in the wall of the Republic of China” entrusted 
with the duty to unite with Japan against the Communist threat, organizations like the ACML 
“co-opted the existing mainstream discourse of Muslim intellectuals into their strategic narrative 
and imposed it on the local Muslim societies once again,” adopting similar rhetoric as that of 
Sino-Muslims before the war.
167
  
Responding to Japan’s efforts, Han Chinese intellectuals in the early 1930s oriented their 
focus toward frontier history and the study of ethnic minorities. Establishing closer ties to Sino-
Muslim intellectuals, they encouraged the proliferation of a Chinese Muslim historiography as a 
way to cement Muslim ties and loyalties to the Chinese nation. They also propagated familiar 
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rhetoric on the “inherent qualities” of Hui that made them natural, productive citizens.168 
Historian Gu Jiegang (1893-1980), a leading advocate of Chinese frontier studies, followed a 
similar line of argument as the KMT mono-minzu policy.
 169
 Stressing that Muslim and non-
Muslim Chinese “had no real racial differences (meiyou zhenzheng de zhongzu qubie),” Gu 
dedicated a special issue of the Yugong Institute journal to Chinese Muslims where he professed, 
“I am not a Muslim. Before 1931, I never paid attention to Islam…Until the four eastern 
provinces (dong si sheng) were lost and Japan’s Mainland policy imposed on us the greatest 
oppression, then I finally paid attention to our borderland (bianjiang).” He went on to state that 
his studies of the Northwest sparked his interest in the Hui and his admiration for “their belief’s 
loyalty, strength, and of their unity and courage in their endeavors.” This alerted him to the 
realization that the Chinese nation’s revival (Zhonghua minzu de fuxing) depended on Chinese 
Muslims’ ability to fulfill their national duty. In order to achieve this, however, non-Muslims 




Saving Country, Saving Faith Redux 
Sino-Muslim political mobilization heightened after full war broke out in 1937. Once 
Japanese attacks forced the KMT to relocate inland from Nanjing to Chongqing, cutting off 
supply lines in the east, the Nationalists began focusing more on securing the Northwest and its 
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Muslim populations, offering financial assistance to the Sino-Muslim warlords of the region in 
return for their allegiance and access to the region’s crucial supply lines and raw materials. The 
KMT also focused on bolstering its image among both domestic and international Muslim 
communities, sponsoring Muslim journals and supporting Sino-Muslim leaders’ plans for 
voluntary anti-Japanese associations and diplomatic missions to the Middle East. Between 1938 




Declaring their aims “to reveal the brutal Japanese invasion of China, the insult Japan has 
inflicted upon Chinese Muslims, as well as the determination of all Chinese people to resist 
Japan,”172 the Hui diplomatic trips abroad on behalf of the KMT government augmented the role 
of Sino-Muslims in domestic and foreign affairs. They were but one example of Sino-Muslim 
intellectuals’ efforts throughout the Republican era to mobilize fellow Muslims and highlight 
their importance as participants in the grand mission of national salvation. Leaders within the 
Hui community, as part of the wave of Sino-Muslims who returned in the 1920s and 1930s from 
studies abroad in the Middle East, combined concepts from Islamic teachings and Chinese 
nationalism to reinforce the “mutually informing” facets of their dual loyalties toward faith and 
nation.
173
 In the years following the Manchurian Incident, a sense of crisis permeated throughout 
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the pages of Sino-Muslim publications, reflecting the larger mood of the country.
174
 Faced with 
another humiliating example of China’s failure to maintain territorial sovereignty, as well as the 
need to “awaken” fellow Muslims and prevent them from being “anesthetized” or lulled astray 
by the Japanese campaign, Sino-Muslims returned to the mantra made famous by Ding Zhuyuan: 
“To save our faith is to save our country, to save our country is to save our faith” (jiu jiao jiu shi 
jiu guo, jiu guo jiu shi jiu jiao).
175
  
Beginning and ending his essay on Muslim unity with the Republican government 
directive “The Huizu is an essential part of the Chinese nation (Zhonghua Minzu),” Yisilan 
contributor Ibrahim, a Sino-Muslim, reinforced Hui inclusion within the Chinese nation-state and 
their resistance to Japan. He argued that, until now, the Sino-Muslim populated regions of Gansu, 
Ningxia, Qinghai, and Shaanxi, as well as “the Turkic Muslim-populated borders of Xinjiang, 
have never been misled by the various propaganda [against China].” Their loyalty could still be 
counted on.
176
 Another contributor Ding Shaoyun corrected the misconception that Islam’s 
universality “as a religion that does not distinguish between state boundaries or racial (zhongzu) 
boundaries meant it does not care about the death of the state and only concerns itself with 
religion,” challenging fellow Hui with the question, “If China were to die, will imperialist 
countries [i.e. Japan] let us [Muslims] live?”177 Clearly rooting Hui identity within the state 
boundaries, Beijing’s Yuehua journal (1929-1948), the most widely-circulated Sino-Muslim 
publication at the time, declared in 1932: “We are Muslims in China, not Muslims in Turkey nor 
                                                          
174
 For an example, see Wen Qi, “The Crisis Facing Islam in China, Part II” (Zhongguo huijiao zhi wei ji, er: Zhongguo 
huijiao zhi wei ji) in Yisilan 1, No. 2, 140. 
175
 This version of Ding’s slogan comes from Zi Qing, “Fu yu Zhongguo ji Yisilan qingnian zhi zeren,” 171.  The use of 
“anesthetize” to describe the Japanese Hui-Muslim campaign comes from a news article “Wei Manzhou Yisilan 
xiehui—riben ren mazui wo Dongbei jiaobao zhi celüe” False Manchurian Islamic Association—Japanese Prepare 
Policies to Anaesthetize/Lull Our Fellow Muslims in the Northeast” in Yisilan 1, No. 4, 202.  
176
Ibrahim, “Yisilan xintu tuanjie qi lai” (Muslims Unite) in Yisilan 1, No. 1, 117-118.  
177
Ding Shaoyun, “Yisilan yu xiandai shehui,” 187. 
79 
 
Muslims in Persia. We are not Muslims from Muslim states. We have to demand a status of 
nationality (minzu) as an integral part of the Chinese nation.”178 The statements of Ding and 
Yuehua implied that Sino-Muslims’ survival was intertwined and inseparable from that of China. 
Despite practicing a universal religion that connected them with the worldwide Islamic 
community, they still shared a national, distinctly “Chinese” identity that granted them a stake in 
China’s welfare. Just as in the late Qing, China’s Muslims could not only save their religion 
while letting their country perish. 
Sino-Muslim intellectuals expanded the work of Wang Haoran and the ahongs of the 
early Republican era to find a “concrete basis” for Hui patriotism within the Koran and Hadith. 
In a 1930 article entitled “Protection of Islam and Love of the State,” Tianjin ahong and KMT 
member Wang Jingzhai (1879-1949) first introduced to China the now-contested hadith phrase 
“love of the fatherland is an article of faith” (hub al-watan min al-iman).179 First hearing “watan” 
during his studies at al-Azhar University in Egypt, Wang cited an Egyptian religious leader’s 
interpretation of the term: “Watan in Arabic means the place where you live. Modern scholars of 
Islamic jurisprudence call watan the land where people’s rights, duties, lives and fortunes are 
entrusted. That is to say, there is no contradiction between people’s freedom and statehood.”180  
While Egyptian Muslim reformers saw watan as connotating a state with a Muslim majority, 
Sino-Muslim reformers saw watan as a Chinese state where, despite the presence of a non-
Muslim majority, Muslims still participated as integral members of the nation while Islamic 
culture served as part of a “multifaceted” Chinese culture. This interpretation was supposed to 
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guide the Hui population away from tensions with Han Chinese while also signaling to the state 
that the Hui were supporters, rather than threats, to China.
181
 In Wang’s opinion, Hui historico-
cultural investigations should look for evidence to justify this connection.  
Traditionally negative stereotypes of the Hui’s “courageous, fierce, and warlike nature” 
were once again inverted to be positive attributes and backed up with historical evidence.
182
 
Drawing a parallel between Sino-Muslims’ ability to survive and resist a foreign invader (the 
Mongols) during the Yuan dynasty and their ability to survive and resist the current foreign 
invader (Japan), scholar Jin Jitang (1908-1978) claimed that during the beginning of Mongol rule 
in China, there were Buddhists and Christians as well as Muslims in the country, but by the end, 
the Muslims resisted assimilation and became a minzu while Buddhists and Christians 
disappeared.
183
 Appropriating the broad history of Islamic civilization as a demonstration of 
Islam’s potential to rescue China from its current state of disorder and war, Ding Shaoyun wrote, 
“The past track record of Islam proves its power. Within a short twenty-three years, [Islam] 
united Europe, Asia, and Africa and accomplished many exceptional achievements."
184
 Even the 
idea of Islamic “martyrdom” became incorporated into the discourse surrounding Hui resistance 
efforts, exemplified in Xue Wenbo’s “Song of the Hui with an anti-Japanese determination” for 
the September 1939 issue of Yuehua:  
The enemies have made their horses drink water from the Yellow River 
The sacred war for national protection has begun 
Muslims have a real spirit, feel ashamed to indulge in living 
But we feel proud to participate in the battle 
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Mosques have been burned down to ruins 
Innocent women and children are shedding blood 
Alas, in China we fifty million Muslims 
Are in disgrace 
 
Religion shows us the way of martyrdom 
Do we feel reluctant to bleed for justice? 
At the defeat of Japan, we yell out and rejoice 




While highlighting the threat Chinese Muslims posed to the foreign enemy, Xue was 
careful to end on the image of the Hui “undressing their military uniform” once peace was 
restored and celebrating with their fellow countrymen. This served the purpose of stressing the 
common goal between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese. Their “violence” would be against the 
Japanese, not against the Han or China. 
Debunking Huihui Yuanlai and the Birth of an Independent Modern Hui Historiography 
Competition for Hui allegiance thus led to increasing interest amongst Sino-Muslim 
scholars to develop new scholarship linking Hui identity to the Chinese nation. In addition to 
political motivations, the intellectual trends of the 1930s impacted the strategies employed by 
Sino-Muslim intellectuals to establish their communal identity. Building on the New Culture 
Movement (mid-1910s to mid-1920s), which had galvanized the popularization of disciplines 
such as anthropology, ethnology, and sociology while stimulating interest in systematic 
examinations of China’s past, courses on these disciplines were offered at major universities in 
Beijing, Nanjing, and Shanghai by the mid-1930s.
186
 Peking University president Cai Yuanpei 
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(1868-1940), one of the first scholars to direct Chinese ethnology toward non-Han minorities, 
established the Academia Sinica (Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan) under the KMT government in 1928 
as a leading institute for the study of natural and social sciences.
187
 The academy included an 
ethnology unit (zu) within its Institute of Social Research (Shehui Yanjiusuo). As director, Cai 
dispatched scholars on annual trips to conduct fieldwork on minorities such as the Miao, She, 
Yao, Hezhe, and Taiwanese aborigines. Research on non-Han minorities increased once Chinese 
universities and scholars were forced to relocate inland during the conflict with Japan.
188
 
The traditional body of knowledge on Hui history fell under scrutiny. While Sino-
Muslims faced new scholarship challenging their authenticity, they also contributed to this 
modern scholarship, utilizing the tools available to build a new definitive and “scientifically-
researched” historiography. One example concerned the challenge to Sino-Muslim origin myths. 
As China transitioned from the late Qing to the Republican era, Huihui yuanlai (The Origin of 
the Hui) continued to influence the development of Chinese Muslim historiography. Even when 
ethnographer Chen Yuan debunked the myth in his 1928 “A Historical Outline of Islam’s 
Entrance to China” (Huihuijiao ru Zhongguo silue), Sino-Muslim intellectuals, though agreeing 
with Chen’s conclusions, still tried to prove that Muslims first arrived in China around the time 
mentioned in the myth.  
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Recognized as the first “Han” position on Hui origins and the first approach by a 
professional modern historian, Chen’s article belonged to a larger series of studies on the 
assimilation (tonghua) and sinicization (hanhua) of non-Chinese peoples under Mongol rule. 
Chen compared the historical claims within Huihui yuanlai to official records from the Tang 
dynasty, outlining discrepancies, and also systematically examined later Chinese sources on the 
Hui. He argued that Muslims in China mostly originated from Central Asia and went through a 
long and gradual assimilation and sinicization process, adopting all the major traits of the 
Chinese while still preserving their religion. Islam survived this assimilation because Muslims 
did not proselytize in China and the religion did not oppose (gongji) Confucianism, protecting it 
from the hostility of the people and the state.
189
 
“A Historical Outline of Islam’s Entrance to China” elicited strong responses from 
Chinese Muslim intellectuals since it challenged the previous dominant Sino-Muslim 
historiography on Islam’s entrance and development in China. It also distinguished between 
Chinese and Muslim identities, emphasizing the Hui’s “non-Chinese” and Central Asian 
backgrounds while rooting their assimilation into China in a Mongol, foreign-led dynasty rather 
than the Chinese-led Tang. As a systemic historical study of Muslim and Chinese histories, 
Chen’s article presented itself as a more scientifically-sound counterweight to popular myths 
and, therefore, could become accepted as the definitive account of Chinese Muslim history.  
In order to challenge Chen’s interpretation, Sino-Muslim intellectuals established 
systematic studies of their own, creating a new proliferation of “Chinese Muslim historiography 
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written by Chinese Muslims for Chinese Muslims.”190 Within a year of Chen’s article, three 
other articles on the origin of Islam in China were published in Sino-Muslim magazines, 
followed by more in the subsequent decade. These articles all quoted Chen’s study and, while 
conceding that myths like Huihui yuanlai were simply a “tradition” (chuanshuo) and not 
historical fact, set about gathering historical fact to prove that Islam entered China during the 
Tang. Their methods grew increasingly sophisticated, incorporating not just Chinese sources but 




Sino-Muslim periodicals published foreign scholarship that supported Hui intellectuals’ 
claims, such as Lu Yuansan’s “Study on Islam’s Entrance into China,” a 1935 translation of the 
work of an American scholar (known in transliteration as Mo’asen). This study endowed Islam 
with a 1300-year-old history in China and, similar to Chen Yuan’s article, worked to debunk or 
point out the fallacies in some of the existing Hui records. In one example, an Islamic plaque in 
Xi’an stated that “Islam first came from the west, and entered China during the time of the 
founding emperor (581 to 601),” yet Muhammad’s famous flight to Medina, marking the start of 
the Islamic calendar, did not occur until 622. It was highly unlikely for Islam to have reached 
China during the years stated on the plaque, although the years on the plaque also would not 
match the Western calendar. Another plaque, in Guangzhou, commemorating the 1351 
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renovation of the mosque mentioned Muslims who on Muhammad’s command came east to 
spread the religion 800 years ago.
192
 
Given the above discrepancies, “Study on Islam’s Entrance into China” went on to cite a 
variety of Chinese and Arabic sources, tracing the long trajectory of Islamic history in China. In 
a departure from Chen’s focus on the Hui’s Central Asian and Mongol influences, Mo’asen’s 
examples supported the Islamic presence in China during the Tang dynasty and specially 
mentioned the early Muslim populations who settled in China’s interior provinces and who came 
from the sea. Studies from the Arabic scholar Kehe’er in 846 recorded Muslims entering China 
by land and by water, with more crossing by water. Another Arabic writer, Abu Zhe’eryiya 
mentioned evidence that the first Muslims in China were merchants and calculated that Islam 
entered China after 800, still within the timeframe of the Tang. Examining the official records 
from the Tang dynasty, Mo’asen found documentation of an ambassador arriving from the west 
(Western Asia, or the Middle East) in 780, suggesting that Muslims could have settled in the 
country within proximity of this date.  
Mo’asen’s research provided Sino-Muslim intellectuals with another example of how to 
approach Hui history and ground it within Chinese history from a variety of different angles, 
including studies of the geographical distribution, demography, and social status of Muslims 
over time. The study observed that Muslims arriving by sea tended to live in coastal areas, with 
Hangzhou as one of the first to have Islamic settlement. Those who came by land mostly lived in 
the interior, with areas like Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan, and Henan having the most Muslims. In 
1271, Beijing had a special surveying department for Muslims. By 1289, Henan province had 
established an Islamic university. From a cultural and genealogical perspective, the study 
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observed that due to “intermarriage between the Hui and Han, the two mutually assimilated 
(liangxiang tonghua),” resulting in similar physical attributes and living habits between the two 
groups, though  some Hui showed clearer signs of their Arabic ancestry with “sharper noses, 
flatter cheekbones, bigger builds, and beards.” Calculating the Sino-Muslim population at around 
five to ten million, Mo’asen also argued that “in society and under the law, Huijiao and Han 
share equal status and power,” with Muslims building on their early merchant roots to hold 
positions in other sectors, including political and military office.
193
  
Though the debunking of origin myths threatened to delegitimize previous Sino-Muslim 
historiography, it also, in some ways, liberated Chinese Muslims as Sino-Muslim intellectuals 
seized the opportunity to fashion a new, “scientific” historiography of Islam in China. In an April 
1935 article on “The Compilation of Chinese Islamic Historical Data,” Bai Shouyi (1909-2000), 
who in later years became one of the most influential Sino-Muslim historians and ethnologists, 
advocated for greater Hui historical scholarship. Born in Kaifeng, Henan Province to a merchant 
family, Bai entered a local religious school at the age of twelve and completed undergraduate 
studies in Henan. After obtaining a graduate degree in Chinese philosophical history from 
Yenching University in 1932, Bai went on to have a distinguished career, joining the capital’s 
geographical and historical research societies, including the Yugong Institute (Yugong xuehui) 
and Beiping Research Institute (Beiping yanjiushuo), before becoming a professor in the 1940s. 
He also served as editor-in-chief to prominent Sino-Muslim publications such as Yuehua and 
Yunnan Qingzhen Duobao and a member of the 1937 surveying team to the Northwest organized 
by Gu Jiegang. After the establishment of the PRC, Bai co-founded the New China Historical 
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Society (Xin Zhongguo shi xuehui) and joined the CCP in 1956 as a representative to the 
National People’s Congress.194  
In his 1935 article, Bai expressed discontent that, despite Islam’s more than a thousand 
year-long presence in China, few books focused on the religion’s national history. Documenting 
a list of previously published works, Bai critiqued their short length and asked for more in-depth 
studies, especially from Chinese Islamic authors. Noting that China’s Huimin “recite Huihui 
yuanlai, even though it is a fabrication, as if it is common sense and pass it down through oral 
tradition as the story of Islam entering China,” Bai expanded the historical and geographic scope 
of Chinese Islam’s origins, writing that “Islam did not enter China through simply one path. It 
arrived to the east through Mount Tai, it came across the seas, it reached poor and remote 
regions.” The rest of the article raised examples of various materials that Sino-Muslim historians 
could excavate and collect, from engraved messages on mosque plaques to photos and both 




The theme of Bai’s article reflected the larger mission of its publication, Yisilan (Islam), a 
1935 Hui journal started in Kaifeng by the Henan Islamic Association. Running a total of five 
issues from January to May, Yisilan printed articles on a variety of topics, from analyses of 
religion, history, and the Hui’s situation in China to publication reviews, translations, and 
Islamic news. News articles raised awareness of the problems and organizational changes facing 
the Chinese Muslim community. Samples include a report on robberies and violence against 
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Sino-Muslims in Hebei province, calling on all Hui to lend support to the families affected, and 
the opening of a Kaifeng mosque propaganda office to address the misunderstandings amongst 
local Muslims regarding their religion.
196
 At a time when Muslims continued to face 
discrimination by non-Muslim Chinese, including offensive remarks in Han publications 
attacking “strange” Muslim religious practices and insults such as “Little Pigsy” (xiao Zhubajie, 
after the half-man, half-pig disciple in the classical Chinese novel Journey to the West, known 
for his gullibility, laziness, greed, and unattractiveness),
197
 Sino-Muslims found extra 
imperatives to emphasize themselves as familiar entities in China’s grand history, with equal 
status to the Han. 
 In its first issue, the Yisilan editors addressed both Muslims and non-Muslims at home 
and overseas, asking for their support and feedback while declaring the journal’s mission to 
foster research and discussion over Hui affairs, including a focus on local history and six key 
questions:  
We are a small group of Hui youth who share one reality: we feel that we know too little 
regarding Huijiao and Huijiaoren’s affairs and have long held a strong interest in them. 
We will explore both broad and narrow questions, including the following: First, our 
original upbringing and education, what was it really like? Do they resemble today’s 
habits in their various implementations? What were their philosophical underpinnings 
and theoretical roots? Second, in terms of our religion’s literature, we have many 
beautiful poems, fables, and stories…what value and significance do they have? Third, 
Western history tells us that the European civilization’s golden age was heavily 
influenced and helped by Islamic civilization. What constituted the special nature of 
Islamic civilization and how did it promote European modern civilization? Fourth, Islam 
entered China a long time ago. What did Islam contribute to China, whether in racial or 
cultural aspects? What did the native Chinese inhabitants give to the Hui? Fifth, it is said 
that there is a significant number of Muslims in Kaifeng. Just what are the demographics 
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of Muslims in Kaifeng? What is the male-female ratio? Sixth, what is the state of Kaifeng 




Through posing these six questions, the editors established a framework to assess and 
document Chinese Muslim culture and history. The contents of Yisilan attempted to strike a 
balance between local, national, and international topics, such as serial translations of an 
Egyptian scholar’s biography of Muhammad and a series on the development of Kaifeng 
Juanzheng Elementary School, fostering a sense of shared history and knowledge on both a 
micro and macro scale while connecting the city’s Muslims to the larger network of Islamic 
associations in the country. Similar to Bai’s April article, the March 10 issue’s editorial note 
“Small-scale Investigations” called on “enthusiastic fellow Muslims” to take responsibility and 
pay greater attention to their own histories. Suggesting that Hui “start with small scale 
investigations, with what is familiar, and work our way up,” the editors provide examples such as 
having members of the Dong Da mosque begin to examine the mosque’s economic situation, 
current reforms, and religious staffer biographies. From these small-scale investigations, Sino-
Muslims intellectuals hoped to gather enough sources to determine which ones should become 
the foundational, authoritative reference materials on Chinese Muslims.
199
 
Made in China: Jin Jitang and Defining Huizu 
Published in the same year as Yisilan, a study by Sino-Muslim scholar Jin Jitang reflected 
a turning point for the development of Sino-Muslim identity. The debate between the Republic 
of Five Lineages and KMT mono-minzu policy’s definition of Huizu provided the stimulus for 
scholarship like Jin’s to tackle the subject of Hui identity. However, Jin did not directly take 
sides in this contest. Instead, he constructed an academic argument that refuted both policies, 
defining “Huizu” as a nationality separate from both Hanzu and Turkic Muslims.  
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A native of Shandong, Jin had been active in the Hui reformist movement since the late 
1920s, teaching in new-style Muslim seminaries and contributing to Sino-Muslim journals. His 
Zhongguo Huijiao shi yanjiu (Studies in the history of Chinese Islam), a study tracing Chinese 
Islam from the Tang to the Qing dynasty, took a step toward teasing out the differences that set 
Sino-Muslims apart from their Turkic and Han counterparts. It separated the criteria for Hui 
minzu status from their ties to Islam, distinguishing between Islam’s religious and cultural forms. 
While Jin recognized Sino-Muslims’ foreign Islamic roots and acknowledged the religion’s role 
in unifying their heterogeneous ancestors, he nevertheless downplayed the religion as a 
necessary characteristic for Sino-Muslims’ nationality status. Jin instead justified the existence of 
a distinct Huizu, one equal to the Hanzu in terms of legitimacy and status, based on their position 
as a “homegrown” nationality created within the boundaries of China. The phenomenon of their 
evolution from a Huijiao (Islamic religious group) to a Huizu (race) only occurred after the 
diverse ancestors of the Hui, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, met and merged within China’s 
borders. It was Islam’s cultural forms, rather than purely its religious aspect, that unified the 
Sino-Muslims into a distinct Chinese nationality separate from the Han.
200
 Other teachings, 
including Buddhism and Christianity, Jin posited, lacked Islam’s unifying power (zonghe zhi 
nengli) and thus failed to create distinct Buddhist and Christian nationalities.
201
 Divided into 
seven parts, Jin’s study opened by laying out the debate:  
Within the territory of the Republic of China (Zhonghua minguo), there are fifty million 
people who practice Huijiao. Within these fifty million Huijiao followers, other than 
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those who live in the Northwest Hui borders (Huijiang) who can easily be seen as 
different from Hanzu people, the others who are mostly scattered throughout the interior 
provinces—if they are not examined closely—would be difficult to distinguish between 
Hui and Han. Thus, in the recent twenty-plus years, studies on the Huizu category hold 
different opinions. Most non-Muslims and a portion of Huijiao believers think that those 
in Huijiang also belong to Huizu. If so, then are not those [Muslims] who live in the 
interior migrants from the Northwest and the descendants of Huihe? And still another 
portion of co-religionist intellectuals believe that we, in terms of zu, are the same as 




Jin argued against both camps. Refuting the notion of shared descent between Turkic and 
Chinese Muslims, Jin saw the Huizu as mixed. They were descendants of migrants who came to 
China from a variety of countries, lands, and ethnic backgrounds—with different appearances, 
habits, languages, and skin colors—from Mongolian and Jurchen settlers to Muslim migrants 
from Persia, Iraq, Turkey, and Central Asia. Only within China, within the country’s borders, did 
they merge together into one nationality. He offered Muslim surnames’ evolution and 
transliteration from Arabic to Chinese, Chinese historical sources, and Hui habits and language 




Echoing the words of Xing Hui Pian writer Bao Tingliang two decades earlier, Jin 
vouched for the unifying power of Islam, declaring, “Because they [the migrants] shared a 
common goal, they all came to China to reside. Because they shared a common religion, a 
common set of beliefs…through time they combined, assimilated, multiplied and grew, and 
became Huizu.”204 Unlike Bao and the late Qing Muslim intellectuals who used the their mixed 
descent to prove that Hui was a religious rather than ethnic marker and open the possibility of 
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Sino-Muslims being Muslim Han, Jin cited evidence in support of the latter category. He argued 
that the Huizu or Sino-Muslims fulfilled Sun Yatsen’s Three Principles of the People’s five 
requirements for minzu formation: blood, livelihood, language, religion, and customs and habits. 
He purposefully created a Hui identity that was non-Han and Chinese. Sino-Muslims were not 
simply members of the Hanzu who happened to practice Huijiao. After setting out to prove that 
Hui came from different foreign ancestors, Jin attempted to balance this argument by arguing 
that the fusion of these disparate elements created a common blood, livelihood, language, 
religion, and customs and habits. Huizu blood (xuetong) was kept “whole” (zhengge) through 
strict marriage customs requiring Muslims to marry someone of the same faith. Non-Muslim 
partners had to convert, and any offspring from the marriage would follow Huijiao. With such a 
practice in place, Jin noted that two Muslims, though they may live far apart, could marry due to 
their shared religion while Hui and Han, despite living in the same area for five hundred years, 
could never become related [by blood].
205
  
Furthering the genetic argument, Jin’s article, similar to “Study on Islam’s Entrance into 
China” in Yisilan, highlighted the physical differences between the Hui and Han peoples (Huiren 
and Hanren) despite years of assimilation. Jin cited a passage from his friend Xue Jinzhang’s 
“Zhongguo Huizu yundong” (China’s Huizu Movement): “Northwest Huizu mostly have tall 
bodies, prominent noses, deep-set eyes, and trimmed beards. Interior Huizu [physical attributes] 
seem to be diminished, but compared to Hanzu, their bodies are somewhat larger, the bridge of 
their noses are somewhat higher, their eyes somewhat deeper-set, and their beards more grown. 
They are still different from the Hanren. Based on my personal experience, when Huiren and 
Hanren are out on the street, I can tell which is Hui and which is Hanren.” Jin followed the 
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passage with a quote from a fortune teller who read people’s faces: “Nanren [Southern Han] 
have different foreheads, Hui have different noses…”206  
For livelihood, customs, and habits, Jin described differences in clothing (especially the 
white hats worn by Sino-Muslim men), diet (with the additional note that dietary differences also 
explained the difference in physical development between Hui and Han), and residential areas 
(the segregation between Hui and Han in cities such as Tianjin, Jining, Jinan, Tongzhou, and 
Beijing). Asserting the strength and wisdom behind Sino-Muslim practices, Jin even claimed that 
today travelers in the Northwest could distinguish that the people they encountered with thick 
beards, white hats, and tall statures were Huimin while those with weak bodies and spirits were 
Hanren, because Huiren, due to their religious rules, did not smoke opium like the Han. For 
language, Jin mentioned that, though in interactions with Hanren and others, Sino-Muslims 
would speak in Hanyu and use Han script, but within their Hui community they often used 
Persian and Arabic. Even when both Han and Sino-Muslims spoke Hanyu, a careful study of 
pronunciation revealed differences between the two groups, including examples from the Ox 
Street community in Beijing and the Mujiazhuang community in Tianjin, as well as communities 
in Gansu, Qinghai, and other provinces.
 207
 
The monikers Sino-Muslims used to refer to fellow Hui and Han revealed the 
consciousness amongst Hui regarding their differences from the Han. The Hui called the Han 
“Han’er ren” and frequented sayings such as, “If I did such a thing, I would be a Han’er ren.” 
Terms also existed to distinguish the Huizu from religious, non-minzu groups such as Buddhists 
and Christians. Jin emphasized the fact that the Hui were called “Huimin” just as the Han were 
called “Hanmin,” but people did not refer to Buddhists as “Fomin” or Protestants as “Jidumin.” 
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While two followers of the same religion may greet each other as “jiaoyou” or “daoyou” 
(friends), Hui referred to co-religionists as “jiaobao” or “jiaoqin” (blood relative).208 In other 
words, Hui and Han were on equal footing as distinct nationalities, but members of other 
religions could not make the same claim.  
Closing Remarks 
Operating within a wartime environment where competing parties articulated different 
visions of Hui identity in a bid to gain Hui allegiance, Sino-Muslim intellectuals used their 
leverage to negotiate a concept of Huizu that would best protect their Chinese-Islamic identities 
and agency. Responding to the Japanese Hui campaign, they led efforts to mobilize their fellow 
Muslims, Turkic and Sino, to maintain loyalty to the Chinese nation and save it from this latest 
crisis. They developed elaborate studies detailing Sino-Muslim origins, genealogy, history, and 
culture in order to affirm their status as a “homegrown” nationality. As “Muslims in China, not 
Muslims in Turkey nor Muslims in Persia,” Sino-Muslims increasingly differentiated between 
their religious and ethnic identities, between their ties to the universal Islamic religion and their 
ties to the territorially-bound Chinese nation where they developed their unique Huizu identity 
and culture. Their lines of argument could be created and employed by others as well. By virtue 
of being a universal religion not tied to one nation or ethnicity, Islam could not be a criterion for 
defining a Hui minzu. But through establishing a communal genealogical and cultural history for 
Sino-Muslims, grounded by “scientific” evidence and distinct from that of Han Chinese and 
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[The Hui minzu] is not one of those native peoples that has always lived on the ancient soil of China (like the Han, 
Miao, or Qiang), nor one of those purely immigrant groups that came to China from abroad (like the Koreans or 
Russians), nor one of the peoples of a border region who have long lived in contact (like the Kazaks or the Dai). 
Rather, it relied upon the tremendous unifying power of Islamic culture, which concentrates Muslims of different 
countries and different languages into a single entity, causing a minzu to form from a blend of foreign elements and 
partially domestic inhabitants, creating a new species. On the vast, broad land of China it planted roots, sprouted, 
bloomed, and produced fruit, becoming an important component of the indivisible, great minzu family of China. 




Through increasingly endowing Sino-Muslims with a separate genealogical and cultural 
history from the Han Chinese and Turkic Muslims, Sino-Muslim intellectuals in the 1930s paved 
the way for a redefinition of Huizu. Previous debate concerning Sino-Muslim identity, from the 
late Qing to the Republican years, mainly revolved around two possibilities. Sino-Muslims could 
be a religious subset of Han Chinese, or they could be members of a broad nationality that 
encompassed all Muslims in China, whether Sino or Turkic. The fact that Sino-Muslims shared 
some characteristics, such as language and geographic distribution, with Han Chinese and yet 
shared other characteristics such as religion with Turkic Muslims meant that they were a difficult 
category to pin down. They could be grouped with Han Chinese or Turkic Muslims. This 
ambiguity proved to be both a benefit and detriment. On the one hand, it provided Sino-Muslims 
with the flexibility to switch between arguing for inclusion as Muslim Han or a broad Hui 
nationality, depending on which best protected their leverage and interests. On the other hand, 
the contested nature of their identity also provided Sino-Muslims with serious challenges. 
Whether categorized with Han Chinese or Turkic Muslims, they were never fully comfortable. 
As a religious subset of Han Chinese, their Islamic identities appeared to be overshadowed. 
Lumped together with Turkic Muslims their similarities to Han Chinese were deemphasized.  
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New arguments put forth by the 1930s scholarship opened up a third possibility, one that 
reflected a rising demand among Sino-Muslims for status as an exclusive ethnic nationality that 
recognized both their Chinese and Islamic identities. As the CCP encountered this demand, its 
Hui ethnopolicy would undergo a major transformation toward the recognition of a Sino-Muslim 
“Huizu.” 
CCP Hui Ethnopolicy Revisited 
By 1940, the CCP began moving toward dividing China’s Muslims into separate minority 
minzu as a way to gain their support. The idea gained traction as the CCP faced Muslim 
opposition to its original definition of Huizu as inclusive of all Muslims in China. In his analysis 
of CCP policy, historian John Lindbeck argued that its effectiveness would necessarily “depend 
on its recognition of two essential features of China’s Moslem population: their religious and 
communal particularism and their racial and cultural diversity.” The local Sino-Muslim elites 
that the Communists encountered in the Northwest wanted Islam to be recognized as a universal 
religion rather than a ‘folk’ religion specific to only one ethnic group. They wanted to protect 
their religious identities as members of a worldwide Islamic community while also maintaining 
their separate genealogical and cultural histories as Sino-Muslims.
210
  
In response, the CCP continued to gather more fieldwork research and experiment with 
its categorization of China’s ethnic nationalities. It published multiple treatises offering greater 
representation to non-Han nationalities. The most influential, The Question of the Huihui 
Nationality (1941), argued that Sino-Muslims, as Huizu, comprised a distinct minzu and were 
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not just a religious subset of the Han. Li Weihan (1896-1984), secretary-general of the central 
committee, even wrote an article arguing that Marxist-Stalinist definitions for nationalities, 
which required ethnic groups to demonstrate a “common language, locality, economy, or 
psychological makeup [culture],” would not provide grounds for denial of Sino-Muslims and 
other minorities as nationalities.
211
 Though the 1930s KMT mono-minzu policy avoided the 
problem of labeling Islam as a racial marker, it also provided an opening for the CCP to 
differentiate itself by promising to protect both the religious unity and cultural and racial 
diversity of Muslim groups in China. In other words, Muslims in China were to have both 
religious freedom and recognition as separate nationalities.
212
 Pointing to the lack of Sino-
Muslim representation in the National Assembly and other Republican legislative bodies, the 
Communists argued that Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT glossed over the ethnic differences 
between Hui and Han in order to “sidestep the issue of political representation and equality.” 
Decrying KMT ethnic policies as a form of paralysis, an obstacle to national awakening, the 
CCP attempted to articulate an alternative system that would allow China’s minority groups to be 
“Chinese” while still preserving their “unique” ethnic identities. 213 
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Sino-Muslim Agency in Huizu Identity Formation 
In reevaluating Sino-Muslim agency, this thesis argues that the CCP was not solely 
responsible for the shift toward the modern PRC definition of Huizu, as a separate ethnic 
category from Turkic Muslims and Han Chinese. The trajectory and arguments behind the 
party’s ethnopolicy did not occur in isolation. Nor was the Huizu a timeless, reified entity. 
Rather, the transformation of “Huizu” from a religious to an ethnic marker was a result of 
decades of Hui activism from the late Qing to the Republican period, reflecting the shift amongst 
Sino-Muslim intellectuals’ conceptions of Hui identity in an era of emerging Chinese 
nationalism.  
Though by no means a definitive study, the Sino-Muslim publications surveyed in this 
thesis suggest that the groundwork for the ethnic division of China’s Muslims can be traced to 
the late Qing. Adapting to changing contexts, Sino-Muslims reconfigured their concepts of 
Huizu based on what could best protect their dual Chinese-Islamic identities and agency within 
the Chinese nation. Within the rhetoric of the 1908 Sino-Muslim journal Xing Hui Pian, one 
could already see the underpinnings of a spatially, historically, and genealogically-charged 
distinction between Sino-Muslims (modern day Huizu) and Turkic Muslims such as the Huihe 
(modern day Uighurs). Late Qing Sino-Muslims maintained that Xinjiang Turkic Muslims were 
one separate race while the Sino-Muslims dispersed across the Chinese interior shared both 
foreign Muslim and Han Chinese ancestry, citing Sino-Muslim origin myths as evidence. 
Responding to the rise of Han nationalism, they defined “Hui” as a religious category made up of 
multiple races “unified” under the power of Islam in order to construct themselves as Muslim 
Han. Their concept of a communal descent and history for Sino-Muslims, however, became a 
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key marker in later years to distinguish Sino-Muslims from not only Turkic Muslims but also 
Han Chinese.  
During the early years of the Chinese Republic (1912-1938), as the state promised 
representation to its “Republic of Five Lineages,” including its categorization of China’s 
Muslims under a collective Huizu, Sino-Muslim elites accepted their membership within this 
Muslim nationality but, as articulated in the sentiments of Xing Hui Pian writers only four years 
before the republic’s founding, Sino-Muslims were not entirely comfortable with being grouped 
with other Muslims under one nationality. In the early Republic, they maintained a level of 
distance between themselves and Turkic Muslims, continuing the pattern of highlighting their 
higher levels of acculturation and socioeconomic advancement. Sino-Muslims would be the 
“leaders” to reform Turkic Muslims’ “backward” ways.  
In the 1930s, the competition for Hui allegiance among the KMT, CCP, and Japan 
facilitated the breakdown of the Republic of Five Lineages concept of Huizu through 
intensifying interest in Sino-Muslim scholarship and historiography written by Sino-Muslims as 
tools to reaffirm their membership within the Chinese nation-state. The studies that emerged 
during this period relied once again on the idea of Sino-Muslim mixed descent propagated by 
Qing origin myths to craft a communal identity for Sino-Muslims, with the addendum of 
historical records and other “scientific” proof to strengthen this narrative. Unlike Qing 
predecessors, however, Republican scholars like Jin Jitang (1908-1978) introduced and defended 
the idea of an exclusively Sino-Muslim “Huizu” nationality separate from both Hanzu and 
Turkic Muslims. Jin aimed to create a Huizu equal in legitimacy and status, rather than simply a 
subset, to the Hanzu by purposefully crafting a Hui identity that was non-Han and yet fully 
Chinese. The “fusion” of Sino-Muslims’ foreign and Chinese ancestors under Islam’s unifying 
100 
 
power created a new people with common blood, livelihood, language, religion, customs and 
habits. The fact that this phenomenon occurred exclusively on Chinese soil meant that Sino-
Muslims, like the Han, were firmly rooted within the Chinese nation.
214
  
Negotiating Sino-Muslim Identity in Modern Day: Old Strategies in New Contexts 
The rhetorical strategies and historiography conceived by Sino-Muslims during the Qing 
and Republican eras still hold resonance today. The extent of this influence, while outside of the 
scope of this thesis, deserves further study. Sino-Muslims in China and Taiwan continue to 
negotiate their roles within an ever-changing socioeconomic and political environment—an 
environment shaped by both domestic and international developments. The economic 
liberalization of the PRC since 1978, with its drive toward a more capitalist market, allowed the 
state to encourage entrepreneurship among the Hui as a national characteristic of the Hui minzu. 
Traditional Hui trade specializations that had been repressed after the CCP’s 1955 
collectivization reforms returned quickly after 1978. For the CCP, emphasizing entrepreneurship 
allowed the party to continue to separate religion from the Hui’s ethnic identity, replacing it with 
a secularist approach.
 
The Huizu have embraced this as not only a way to benefit financially, but 
also as a way to secure a position within the new dominant narrative of China since its economic 
liberalization.
215
 This attempt to define a common Hui culture rather than a common Hui religion 
returned to the kind of logic first introduced during the Republican era by Sino-Muslim 
intellectuals such as Jin, where Islamic culture became a separable entity from Islamic religion. 
Adapted to the PRC minzu paradigm, this logic now meant that Huizu identity, defined based on 
‘cultural’ rather than religious markers, similarly became a separate entity from Islamic religion.  
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In general, the increased diplomatic and commercial relations with Islamic states in the 
Middle East and Southeast Asia for both the PRC and Taiwan in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries mean Sino-Muslims are occupying an important position for the state. In 
order to promote goodwill with Islamic nations, the state has to prove that it is protecting its 
domestic Muslim population. Through increased study abroad opportunities and pilgrimages to 
Muslim sites, more Sino-Muslims are participating within the international Islamic community. 
Calling for greater Muslim activism and education “to promote the modernization of worldwide 
Islam,” Salahuding Ma Chao-yen, imam of the Taipei Grand Mosque, echoes both Qing Sino-
Muslim literati’s efforts to connect Islam and Confucianism and Republican Sino-Muslim 
intellectuals’ efforts to connect Islam and modernity. Ma writes, “As Muslim in Taiwan, we wish 
to become the bridge between Islam and Chinese culture.  By working together Confucius’ belief 
in world peace with Islam’s belief in social equality and justice, Islam will be the foundation for 
human civilization and peaceful society.”216 
Islam’s compatibility with Chinese culture remains an important framework for Sino-
Muslims as they maintain dual Chinese and Muslim identities and market themselves as an 
important “bridge” between the two worlds. Though Sino-Muslims faced repeated struggles to 
invent and reinvent their roles within China’s national narrative, their history of negotiations 
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